China Neican: the Capitol, HK, United Front, 996
12 January 2021
China Neican is a newsletter by Yun Jiang and Adam Ni from the Australian Centre on China in the World, and the China Policy Centre in Canberra. The newsletter is also published as a weekly column on the China Story blog. The name Neican 内参 (“internal reference”) comes from limited circulation reports only for the eyes of high-ranking officials in China, dealing with topics deemed too sensitive for public consumption. To receive regular updates, please subscribe. You can find past issues here.
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- Yun and Adam
1. The storming of the Capitol
The storming of the Capitol by Trump supporters is a vivid reminder that national security threats don’t just come from the “outside” but often originate at home, and sometimes within the government itself. A myopic focus on China that squeezes out other national security priorities could be just as damaging as not taking China policy challenges seriously.
National security priorities
While the US Government has focused on threats coming from China in recent years, it has consistently turned a blind eye to the threats from domestic far-right extremists, including their infiltration of law enforcement and security services. We saw this dramatically underlined on January 6: even as the Trump mob was in the process of storming the Capitol, Mike Pompeo was still tweeting about 5G and the dangers of Huawei.
As Elsa Kania notes:
[E]ven in the face of such urgent dangers to the security and integrity of U.S. national security, certain American politicians and policymakers continue to assert that the primary dangers to the United States and its national security come from China. To be sure, China’s rise presents significant challenges...yet to point to a foreign adversary or competitor as the chief threat when there is such shameful sedition at home is at best terribly discordant...Over the past four years, American strategy has concentrated on “great-power competition” as a priority. But from today we should be more concerned about great-power self-destruction, as the failures of leadership during the Trump administration and attempted sabotage of our democracy by right-wing extremists continues, in ways that can also benefit Beijing.
US politicians are not alone among Western politicians in prioritising threats from China far above home-brewed threats. For example, many Australian political leaders have been focusing on, and in some cases overblowing, threats coming from China, while denying or downplaying the dangers of right-wing extremism.
Senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells attacked Australia’s domestic intelligence chief for using the term “right-wing” while warning of the growing threat of right-wing extremism.
Liberal/National MPs George Christensen and Craig Kelly have been spreading disinformation in support of Trump. When asked whether he will condemn the MPs for their actions, Prime Minister Morrison replied: “Australia is a free country. There’s such a thing as freedom of speech in this country and that will continue.”
There is no doubt that China poses formidable challenges. Yet, that should not blind governments to other threats to national security.
Democracy and doing the right thing
Following the storming of the Capitol, one narrative became commonplace among the foreign policy observers: the biggest beneficiary of the crisis confronting US democracy is China. This narrative has been used to shame those that have contributed to this crisis by pointing to an external enemy.
But democracies should not need the existence of an external enemy to do the right thing.
Our “China challenge” is a reflection of our own anxieties, fears and domestic politics. Beijing poses numerous challenges, but these challenges are mediated, understood, and twisted through our own frameworks and biases. We use China as the “other” that stands in contrast to “us”. China is a real country with real people and real problems, it’s not a stand-in for your problems, imagined or real.
The rhetoric of democracy vs authoritarianism that many leverage in their China discourse collapses the complexity and obscures the true fight for human freedom, a battle not between China and the West, but between those oppressed and those that are oppressing them across the world.
The US: some lessons
According to the ABC:
This sense of shock also ricocheted through the circles of Australian foreign policy analysts and experts trying to grapple with the full implications of the political psychosis which now seems to have a grip on millions of Americans.
We were surprised by this shock! Have they not been paying attention in the last four years of Trump’s presidency? Did Trump and his supporters not tell us in plain language exactly what they intended to do?
In any case, here are two observations. First, many Australians see the US and China through ideological lenses that idealise democracy and authoritarianism as absolute categories instead of relative states. While in recent years the Australian Government and foreign policy analysts have become more “clear-eyed” (a buzzword) on China, we have certainly not become more “clear-eyed” on the US. Australian political leaders and mainstream media talk ceaselessly about China’s threats. But they have mostly ignored Trump’s threat to democratic values, a threat rooted in a century of American imperialism.
Many are trying hard to convince themselves that the US has not changed, that it would be “business as usual” when Biden replaces Trump in the White House. It may be comforting to hear Biden say “This is not who we are.” But just as China has changed under Xi and becomes more authoritarian (something that most Australians now realise), the US has also changed under Trump. Even with a Biden Administration, there will still be significant challenges to social and political cohesion. Democracy in the US will likely be gripped by instability for years to come. We are closer to the beginning than the end.
There is a common saying among those who study CCP ideology: that you just have to read what the CCP writes and listen to what it says. The same thing is true for Trump and his supporters. They were clear. We just had to listen.
The act of seeing the US through rosy lenses is quite obvious in the languages we use. For example, when Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne made a speech about disinformation, she only mentioned China and Russia. What’s coming out of the US is not referred to as “disinformation” at all. Similarly, interference from China is labelled interference, but not when it’s from the US.
This is illustrative of a foreign policy based on expediency and prejudice, and not principles.
Second, the circle of “Australian foreign policy analysts and experts” and the media are not diverse enough. The issue of race is very prominent in the US. Before the latest crisis, there have been many incidents of armed white supremacists protesting at and occupying government buildings. But these incidents were more often than not ignored by those in the Australian foreign policy circles, because they are “racial” or “social” issues, which are deemed nowhere as sexy or important as “strategic competition” and “foreign interference”. People from different racial backgrounds and their allies would probably have paid more attention to “racial” issues.
For those who have been paying attention to white supremacy, far-right movements, or disinformation in the US, this really should not come as a surprise at all. For example, Jennifer Hunt who researches disinformation in the US has warned Australia about this. And Australia should be vigilant, as it shares some similar problems to the US.
Our myopic focus on China when it comes to national security must be supplanted by a perspective informed by evidence, history, self-reflection, and empathy.
2. Hong Kong: mass arrests
The US is not the only place where democracy is under assault this week. In Hong Kong, local authorities rounded up more than 50 pro-democracy politicians and activists on alleged violations of the National Security Law. They potentially face charges of subversion for their role in an unofficial primary election held last year.
Since the National Security Law came into effect in July 2020, the Beijing and Hong Kong governments have escalated their campaign against the political opposition. In November, Beijing ousted four pro-democracy legislators from Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The remaining 15 opposition legislators resigned in solidarity. In August, a dozen opposition candidates for the upcoming Legislative Council election were disqualified on the grounds of advocating for independence and/or objecting to the National Security Law. And during the year, the authorities arrested and/or imprisoned a number of high profile opposition activists, including media mogul Jimmy Lai, and former Demosistō leaders, Agnes Chow and Joshua Wong.
The latest sweeping arrests further reduce the public space for dissent and political opposition in the city. When the National Security Law was first imposed, Beijing argued that the law’s applicability would be narrow, targeting only those posing egregious threats. But it is clear that the law is being used to target normal political activities and expressions.
Beijing is not only interested in shutting down secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces, it wants to shut down dissent. Period. It is obvious that the prospect for Hong Kong’s democracy and autonomy in 2021 is very gloomy indeed.
As Beijing continues to erode the freedoms of Hong Kongers and the autonomy of the city, we will likely see ongoing oppression and resistance. Oppression will sow seeds of resentment and prompt resistance on which basis Beijing would justify further coercive measures.
Hong Kong’s descent into darkness continues...
3. United Front regulations
The CCP publicly released the CCP United Front Works Regulations 中国共产党统一战线工作条例 on Wednesday. This set of regulations is an updated version of the trial regulations on united front work that was published in September 2015.
For background, the united front is both a strategy as well as an institutional system that the CCP uses to gain influence and maintain legitimacy. In recent years, much international attention has been focused on united front operations in the context of foreign influence and interference. However, it’s worth pointing out that united front efforts are overwhelmingly domestically-oriented.
For Mao, the united front is one of “three talismans” of the CCP, alongside party-building and military struggle. The importance of united front work declined following the Communist consolidation of power in the 1950s, as the relationship between the CCP and China’s elites turned decisively from co-optation towards prosecution.
The importance of united front work rebounded in the 1990s with China’s rapid economic development and social change. Under Xi, the united front system has undergone a renewal, with more resources and elevated bureaucratic importance. The underlying logic is that co-optation and influence have acquired added importance as the Party re-tighten control over the Chinese society. This is especially so in light of the formation of new social groups, professions and identities from the profound social, economic and technological changes of the past two decades.
Now, to the new regulations...there are two major changes between the 2015 trial regulations and the new regulations that stood out. The first appears at the beginning of the new regulations:
Article 1. This regulation is formulated in accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China. It is formulated in order to strengthen the centralised and unified leadership of the Party over united front work, improve its scientificness, standardisation and institutionalisation, and consolidate and develop the Patriotic United Front.
第一条 为了加强党对统一战线工作的集中统一领导，提高统一战线工作的科学化规范化制度化水平，巩固和发展爱国统一战线，根据《中国共产党章程》，制定本条例。
The “centralised and unified leadership of the Party over united front work” bit is key because it underscores the vision and challenge for united front work. The Central Committee created the Central United Front Work Leading Small Group 中央统战工作领导小组 alongside the 2015 trial regulations, the first of its kind. From 2017 to 2018, the united front system saw major organisational restructuring and streamlining. In short, the CCP has been revamping the hardware and software of the United Front so that it can tackle new challenges, such as influencing new social groups. And centralised party leadership is now seen as the guiding principle of united front work as opposed to a more decentralised mode of operation.
The second major change that stands out is the clear articulation of the principles of united front work, which were not in the 2015 trial regulations:
Article 4. The principles of the united front work are:
(a) Adherence to the leadership of the Communist Party of China.
(2) Adhering to holding high the banner of patriotism and socialism
(3) Adhering to the centre and serving the overall situation
(4) Adherence to great unity and solidarity
(5) Adhering to the correct handling of the relationship between unity and diversity
(6) Insist on respecting, safeguarding and taking care of the interests of allies
(7) Insisting on making friends outside the Party extensively and deeply
(viii) Adhering Great United Front Work plan.
第四条 统一战线工作的原则是：
（一）坚持中国共产党的领导；
（二）坚持高举爱国主义、社会主义旗帜；
（三）坚持围绕中心、服务大局；
（四）坚持大团结大联合；
（五）坚持正确处理一致性和多样性关系；
（六）坚持尊重、维护和照顾同盟者利益；
（七）坚持广交、深交党外朋友；
（八）坚持大统战工作格局。
Here are the targets of united front work:
Article 5. The scope of united front work:
(i) Members of [China’s] democratic parties.
(ii) Persons without party affiliation.
(iii) Intellectuals outside the Party
(iv) Persons belonging to ethnic minorities
(v) Persons from religious circles
(vi) Persons from the non-public sector of the economy
(vii) People from new social strata
(viii) Persons who have gone abroad to study and those who have returned from study abroad
(ix) Hong Kong and Macao compatriots
(x) Compatriots in Taiwan and their relatives on the mainland
(xi) Overseas Chinese, returned overseas Chinese and their families
(xii) Other people who need to be contacted and united.
The targets of the united front are people outside the Party, with emphasis on the representatives of these people.
第五条 统一战线工作范围是：
（一）民主党派成员；
（二）无党派人士；
（三）党外知识分子；
（四）少数民族人士；
（五）宗教界人士；
（六）非公有制经济人士；
（七）新的社会阶层人士；
（八）出国和归国留学人员；
（九）香港同胞、澳门同胞；
（十）台湾同胞及其在大陆的亲属；
（十一）华侨、归侨及侨眷；
（十二）其他需要联系和团结的人员。
统一战线工作对象为党外人士，重点是其中的代表人士。
In addition to the clarifying of overall orientation and the addition of united front work principles, the new regulations also contain three new chapters: “New Social Strata united front work 新的社会阶层人士统一战线工作”; “Overseas united front work and overseas Chinese affairs work 海外统一战线工作和侨务工作”; and “United Front Work Department Self-Development 统战部门自身建设”. These new chapters highlight the areas of increased focus for the United Front system.
Below is a rough translation of the chapter on Overseas united front work and overseas Chinese affairs work:
Chapter X Overseas United Front Work and Overseas Chinese Affairs Work
第十章 海外统一战线工作和侨务工作
Article 37. The main tasks of overseas united front work are: to strengthen ideological and political leadership, enhance the love of overseas Chinese and overseas students for the motherland and their understanding and acceptance of the Communist Party of China and socialism with Chinese characteristics; to inherit and carry forward the excellent Chinese culture and promote cultural exchanges between China and overseas; to encourage overseas Chinese to participate in China's reform and opening up and socialist modernization and integrate into the great national rejuvenation; to curb "Taiwan independence" and other separatist forces and safeguard the core interests of the country; to play the role of a bridge and link to promote friendship between China and overseas and create a favourable international environment.
第三十七条 海外统一战线工作的主要任务是：加强思想政治引领，增进华侨和出国留学人员等对祖国的热爱和对中国共产党、中国特色社会主义的理解认同；传承和弘扬中华优秀文化，促进中外文化交流；鼓励华侨参与我国改革开放和社会主义现代化建设，融入民族复兴伟业；遏制“台独”等分裂势力，维护国家核心利益；发挥促进中外友好的桥梁纽带作用，营造良好国际环境。
Article 38: The main tasks of overseas Chinese affairs work are: to focus on the theme of uniting efforts and sharing the Chinese dream and strengthen the work of representatives of overseas Chinese, returning overseas Chinese and their families, gather their hearts and minds, pool their wisdom, bring their strength into play, safeguard their interests and serve them; to coordinate domestic overseas Chinese affairs and overseas Chinese affairs work abroad, focus on cultivating overseas Chinese resources, guide overseas Chinese, returning overseas Chinese and their families to devote themselves to the modernisation of the motherland, safeguard and promote the reunification of China, to realise the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, to enhance friendship and cooperation and exchanges between the Chinese people and the people of the world, and promote the building of a community with shared future for mankind.
Protect the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese, care for their survival and development, promote the building of a harmonious overseas Chinese community, educate and guide overseas Chinese to abide by the laws of their country of residence, respect local culture and customs, better integrate into mainstream society, contribute their wisdom and strength to the economic and social development of their country of residence, and fully demonstrate the image of a law-abiding, honest, civilised, caring, united and harmonious overseas Chinese community.
Protect the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese and their families, give appropriate due consideration to the characteristics of overseas Chinese and their families, and actively play their advantageous role of having extensive ties with overseas.
第三十八条 侨务工作的主要任务是：围绕凝心聚力同圆共享中国梦的主题，加强华侨、归侨、侨眷代表人士工作，凝聚侨心、汇集侨智、发挥侨力、维护侨益，为侨服务；统筹国内侨务和国外侨务工作，着力涵养侨务资源，引导华侨、归侨、侨眷致力于祖国现代化建设，维护和促进中国统一，实现中华民族伟大复兴，致力于增进中国人民与世界人民的友好合作交流，推动构建人类命运共同体。
保护华侨正当权利和利益，关心华侨的生存和发展，推动和谐侨社建设，教育引导华侨遵守住在国法律，尊重当地文化习俗，更好融入主流社会，为住在国经济社会发展贡献智慧和力量，充分展现守法诚信、举止文明、关爱社会、团结和谐的大国侨民形象。
保护归侨、侨眷合法权利和利益，适当照顾归侨、侨眷特点，积极发挥他们与海外联系广泛的优势作用。
In sum, the United Front system is undergoing a renewal because united front tactics have acquired an added importance in light of China’s transformation in recent decades. The Party needs to influence the non-party elite and legitimise itself perhaps more so than any time since 1949. United Front is the velvet glove of the party-state in a new era epitomised by online celebrities, rising religiosity, and tech entrepreneurs. The latest regulation should be seen as another sign of the institutionalisation and revival of united front work and system under Xi.
4. China’s work culture
Understanding labour rights and labour movements are crucial for understanding China. Labour movements have been the cause of unrest, protests, and subjected to crackdowns by authorities. The Made in China Journal has made a syllabus on Chinese Labour.
Migrant workers is a marginalised group that faces numerous social injustices and state-sanctioned discrimination. They work in factories with poor working and living conditions, in many cases under the strict control of the factory owners or labour-hire companies. The social security and welfare provided by the government are substandard, due to their rural hukou (household registrations).
More recently, the plights of workers at tech companies have also come under the spotlight. Jack Ma of Alibaba and Richard Liu of JD.com both publicly support the “996 system”. The 996 system is where employees work from 9 am to 9 pm for six days a week. It is a system mostly associated with tech companies in China. In 2019, there was a viral campaign against 996 on GitHub. However, it did not appear to achieve the desired effect.
Pinduoduo 拼多多 is an e-commerce platform, like Alibaba and JD.com. It is listed on NASDAQ. This week, the death of a 22-year-old Pinduoduo employee who collapsed while working home at 1:30 am created a strong reaction online. While the death is not officially linked to overwork, it sparked virulent criticism of 996. Criticisms only intensified after Pinduoduo posted a dismissive response, saying that “Look at people from the underclass, which one is not trading their lives for money… This is an era where you use your life to fight (拼 pin)”. Pinduoduo later claimed the message was posted as a mistake. Later this week, another employee of Pinduoduo committed suicide. The latest incident reminded many of Foxconn suicides in 2010.
Another employee was fired within half an hour of posting anonymously about his colleague who collapsed after overwork. He said employees at Pinduoduo are required to work in excess of 300 hours a month (more than 75 hours a week). If you can understand Mandarin, watch the full video. Some of the online reaction made references to the PRC National Anthem (Arise, those who refuse to be slaves) or the Internationale (Arise, slaves afflicted by hunger and cold):
The labour abuse situation in China is reminiscent of early capitalism from a Charles Dickens novel. The CCP got in power supposedly on the back of support from peasants and workers, but peasants and workers are the ones that are most disadvantaged in the New China. Although China has labour protection laws, including those outlawing overwork, most authorities are not interested in enforcing these labour standards. The authorities’ interests are more aligned with the “capitalists” or the business owners, through industrial development, taxation, and/or profiteering through corruption.
There are no independent unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions is the only “union”, though it is more interested in helping to create a stable political environment rather than addressing genuine grievances.
Peasants and workers are idealised in the People’s Republic. During the Mao era, they were idealised as the purest of revolutionary classes. And yet, their interests are often low on the priority of the government. Likewise, today’s urban low-end tech workers and delivery drivers are agitating for better treatment, including by voicing their reservation about the 996 culture.
Chinoiserie
In China’s Belt and Road: Down but not Out, analysts at the Rhodium Group argue that there are structural reasons to believe the Boston University dataset may underestimate China’s overseas lending activity, including the decision to filter out commercial bank loans. However, they believe 2020 is likely the crucial turning point for BRI, due to the pandemic.
Tony Lin examines How to quit the CCP. US immigration officers are requesting evidence of non-affiliation with the CCP. But there are no official forms for CCP members looking to quit, so some are turning to Taobao to purchase an official “Communist Party Withdrawal Certificate”. Some of such services are backed by Falun Gong.
MarcoPolo looks at What’s Overlooked and What’s Overhyped in 2020.
China Story
David C. Logan, China’s Missile Forces: Risks of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement: The potential risks of nuclear-conventional entanglement in China’s missile forces has drawn increasing concern from American observers. This entanglement could increase the likelihood of nuclear use in a crisis or conflict. But much of the details of how and why that entanglement exists has remained unknown to analysts. In research recently published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, I find that while the risks of entanglement are less acute than other analysts have feared, they are real and likely to evolve. Significantly, American and Chinese strategists appear to have starkly different views of the dimensions, drivers, and risks of this entanglement. Addressing the risks will require concerted effort to reduce entanglement within China’s missile forces and to reduce the chances of misperception between China and the United States.
Walter Kerr, Why Xi Jinping Isn’t Listening to China’s Foreign Policy Moderates: In a compendium of essays published recently about the future of US-China relations, eleven of China’s top foreign policy thinkers made familiar arguments, including that US global influence is waning and that China can reshape international systems. Some experts also took the unusual step of arguing that China should adopt a more self-effacing foreign policy. Xi Jinping is unlikely to heed that advice, however, especially as he tries to fashion himself as a stronger version of Deng Xiaoping. But if Joe Biden takes a more multilateral foreign policy approach than his predecessor did, Xi may determine that he has no better choice.