Summit

Biden and Xi held a virtual summit [US readout | PRC readout (in Chinese)]. While the US readout is only four paragraphs, the Chinese readout ran to 20 paragraphs, mostly paraphrasing Xi.

Both readouts are very polite, couched in diplomatic rhetoric 外交辞令. Such diplomatic rhetoric has been helpfully translated by Chinese people online previously:

坦率交谈 — 分歧很大，无法沟通

Talked frankly — great disagreement, cannot communicate

交换了意见 — 会谈各说各的，没有达成协议

Exchanged views — each discussed their own views, no agreement reached.

充分交换了意见 — 双方无法达成协议，吵得厉害

Substantial exchange of views — the two sides could not reach an agreement and quarrelled a lot.

增进了双方的了解 — 双方分歧很大

Increased understanding of each other — the parties disagreed a lot

会谈是有益的 — 双方目标暂时相距甚远，能坐下来谈就很好，没有具体成果

The talks were useful — the parties’ goals were so far apart that it was good just to be able to talk, no concrete results

With this in mind, according to the US readout, the two leaders spoke “candidly and straightforwardly”. According to the Chinese side, the talk was judged to be frank, constructive, substantive and productive “坦率、建设性、实质性和富有成效的”.

The meeting allows both sides to claim success — the fact that they can sit down and talk in the context of the tense relationship is seen as a positive signal for their domestic messaging as well as internationally. Both countries emphasised a shared interest in ensuring that conflict does not occur. The US refers to “common-sense guardrails”, while the PRC used the analogy of ensuring two ships do not veer off the course, slow down or collide 不偏航、不失速，更不能相撞.

However, their differences are evident and remain unresolved. China called for the two countries to find the right way to get along 找到正确的相处之道, signalling that it wants the US to accommodate its interests more as a great power and to be respected on an equal footing. Indeed, China repeatedly emphasised the unique responsibilities of the two leaders: 中美两国领导人的共同使命.

While the US readout did not mention what Xi has said. The PRC readout attempted to paraphrase Biden (justly or not). According to the PRC, Biden said:

中国在5000多年前就已经是一个大国。我愿明确重申，美方不寻求改变中国的体制，不寻求通过强化同盟关系反对中国，无意同中国发生冲突。美国政府致力于奉行长期一贯的一个中国政策，不支持“台独”，希望台海地区保持和平稳定。

China was a great power already 5000 years ago. I want to reiterate clearly that the US does not seek to change China’s system of governance, does not seek to counter China through alliances, and has no intention to have conflict with China. The US government is devoted to pursuing the longstanding one China policy and does not support Taiwan independence and hopes that the Taiwan Strait will remain peaceful and stable.

Taiwan formed a substantial part of the short US readout. The US “opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo” and referenced the “one China” policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The PRC only mentioned the “one China” policy and reiterated the same messaging as before:

我们是有耐心的，愿以最大诚意、尽最大努力争取和平统一的前景，但如果“台独”分裂势力挑衅逼迫，甚至突破红线，我们将不得不采取断然措施。

We are patient and will use our greatest sincerity and greatest effort to strive for a peaceful reunification. But if the secessionist forces of Taiwan independence provoke, or even break our red line, we will have to take decisive measures.

On the surface, it seems a compromise is possible — as long as no one disrupts the status quo or provokes the other side, then peace can be assured for now. However, the tricky thing is each side believes that it is keeping the status quo and is being patient while the other side is changing it through their actions and rhetoric.

Journalists

After the summit, the US and China announced separately an agreement on foreign journalists. Under this agreement, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The New York Times can send journalists back to China. The US will provide year-long visas for foreign reporters.

Less official restrictions for journalists is certainly good. However, journalists will still face unofficial barriers to work in China, including harassment. Further, Haze Fan, who works for Bloomberg, remains in detention, underscoring the dangers of being a journalist in China.

Olympics

The US is considering a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics. A diplomatic boycott means athletes could still attend, but government officials would not. For countries wanting to signal their concerns about China’s hosting, it is a good approach.

After all, it is not essential for government officials to attend the Olympics. Olympics should be about athletes, and they could still shine without government officials being present. For spectators, they would hardly notice the difference.

If the US was to proceed with a diplomatic boycott, other countries are likely to follow.

2. Ideology competition

The idea that the US and China are in an ideological competition mirroring the Cold War has become almost an accepted narrative. Just like the previous competition between capitalism and communism, now the competition is between democracy and authoritarianism, or so the narrative goes.

Recently, Anne Applebaum wrote a The Atlantic cover story “The Bad Guys Are Winning” on the decline of democracy around the world, and called for the US to promote democracy.

In these narratives, the US is the beacon of democracy. However, such narratives always ignore the roles the US has played to prop up authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia. The label “bad guys” and authoritarian is usually applied to countries that are not friendly to the US.

Yet, a new study found that the US and its allies “accounted for a significantly outsize share of global democratic backsliding in the last decade”.

They suggest that much of the world’s backsliding is not imposed on democracies by foreign powers, but rather is a rot rising within the world’s most powerful network of mostly democratic alliances. [...]

But, often, the trend was driven by a shift toward illiberal democracy. In that form of government, elected leaders behave more like strongmen and political institutions are eroded, but personal rights mostly remain (except, often, for minorities). U.S. allies often led this trend. Turkey, Hungary, Israel and the Philippines are all examples.

Since there is a negative correlation between being a US ally and democratisation, then it indicates that the US is currently not a force for democracy. Of course, this also does not necessarily suggest that the US is a force against democracy.

Both the US and China are willing to cooperate with democracies and autocracies alike. During the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the US toppled democratically elected socialist governments to install authoritarian capitalism. In contrast, in the last decade, the US has not toppled authoritarian governments in order to install democracy. The last time it occurred was Operation Iraqi Freedom, which started in 2003. On the other hand, it is continuing to support Saudi Arabia, including through arms sales, as well as refraining from criticising its allies and partners undergoing democratic decline.

In sum, the promotion of democracy/authoritarianism is not at the forefront of US-China competition.

3. Peng Shuai

We’ve been following the story of Peng Shuai for more than two weeks now. The story has become more incredulous as it generated more attention worldwide.

We wrote when the story first broke that “Going against a senior CCP official (who is not already in trouble with the CCP) can ruin Peng’s life.” Unfortunately, it looks like our fear has been realised.

CGTN published a supposed email from Peng to the WTA Chairman and CEO Steve Simon. This supposed email was intended to reassure, but it had the opposite effect. In fact, this “email” reminds us of the “forced confessions” that CGTN often trots out on national TV. It is unbelievable and indefensible.

Simon as well as prominent tennis players including Serena Williams, Naomi Osaka, and Novak Djokovic have come out in support of Peng, asking about her wellbeing and whereabouts. It is a good sign that sporting bodies and individual players are supporting their colleagues. Indeed,  WTA has signalled it is willing to lose business in China over this.

We may see retaliation from the Chinese Government on these sporting bodies and players, even though it would only draw more attention to Peng’s case.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

The 6th Plenum concluded on Thursday with a communiqué [Chinese | English] that held little surprises: Xi was lionised and history whitewashed.

We put together a bilingual side-by-side version of the communiqué for those of you preferring to work with both languages:

Click here to download the PDF

The most significant outcome of the plenum is the adoption of a resolution on history. The full title is the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century 《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》.

The text of this highly anticipated resolution has not yet been made public, but we can infer its key message from the communiqué, which discusses history in some length.

Coming in at 7,400 Chinese characters, the plenum communiqué is the longest in recent decades. Essentially, it tries to do three things: 

1. It lionises Xi Jinping and paves the way for him to resume a third term in 2022 at the Party Congress.

2. It justifies the Party’s monopoly of power by providing an account of its past achievements.

3. It draws a linear and distorted historical narrative that supports Xi’s leadership and the Party’s rule.

Xi is the one

In the leadup to and during the plenum, we saw some cringeworthy sycophancy that portrayed Xi as the chosen one. One Xinhua profile, for example, painted this picture:

Since being elected general secretary of the CPC Central Committee in November 2012, Xi has been seen as a man of determination and action, a man of profound thoughts and feelings, a man who inherited a legacy but dares to innovate, and a man who has forward-looking vision and is committed to working tirelessly.

...

On the new journey, Xi is undoubtedly the core figure in charting the course of history. How will he lead the Party in the face of opportunities and challenges? How will he bring China back to the world's center stage? Today, the world is watching Xi just closely as nine years ago.

Likewise, the plenum communiqué lionises Xi, lavishes praise on his leadership record, and characterise him as indispensable: 

The Party has established Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole…[this] is of decisive significance for advancing the cause of the Party and the country in the new era and for driving forward the historic process of national rejuvenation.

...

the Central Committee, with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, has demonstrated great historical initiative, tremendous political courage, and a powerful sense of mission...it has prompted historic achievements and historic shifts in the cause of the Party and the country.

The building of Xi’s cult has been going on for some time, but it is now at new heights.

What it all boils down to is the reality of power: the communiqué and the resolution on history demonstrate Xi’s power and are in turn instruments for its consolidation as we move towards the 2022 Party Congress.

History as farce

The communiqué provides a linear and twisted version of history, one that is sanitised, unreflective and oppressive. In this version of history, the CCP has stood China up, freed its people from oppression, and dragged them out of poverty. In this version of history, a glorious future is already carved into the stone of destiny.

Given the Party’s “extraordinary historical achievements,” is there a reason for the Chinese nation and its people to change the vehicle of historical change that is the Party as they embark on a “new journey” (whatever that entails)? This is the Party’s argument for its continued monopoly of power, one that is seductive to many in China. After all, how can one disagree when “The Party has proved to be a great, glorious, and correct party” by virtue of historical truth?

But as you and I both know, this version of history does not reflect the tortuous roads modern China has travelled, the darker sides of the Party’s past, and contingency in the making of history.

What the Party calls history, then, is actually drudgery in the service of power. It involves waging an eternal war against truth and memory.

Reflections

You’ll be hearing more from us on the 6th Plenum, but for now, we leave behind politics and present you with a poem, a quote and a song:

Ozymandias (by Percy Shelly)

I met a traveller from an antique land,

Who said—“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone

Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand,

Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown,

And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,

Tell that its sculptor well those passions read

Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,

The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;

And on the pedestal, these words appear:

My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings;

Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay

Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare

The lone and level sands stretch far away.”

The fundamental pillar of the present totalitarian system is the existence of a single, central agent of all truth and all power (a kind of institutionalised ‘rationale of history’) which also becomes, quite naturally, the sole agent of all social activity. This activity ceases to be an arena in which different more or less autonomous agents square off; and becomes no more than the manifestation and fulfilment of the truth and the will of a single agent. In a world governed by this principle, there is no room for mystery; proprietorship of complete truth means that everything is known ahead of time. And where everything is known ahead of time there is no soil for the story to grow out of.

(from Stories and Totalitarianism by Václav Havel, translated by Paul Wilson, quoted by Geremie Barmé in History as Boredom) 

And finally, a song to break the monotony and hubris:

Fighting evil by moonlight

Winning love by daylight

Never running from a real fight

Xi is the one…

Xi will never turn her back on a friend

Xi is always there to defend

Xi is the one on whom we can depend

Xi is the one…

2. Climate declaration

The US and China announced a surprise joint declaration on climate change.

The fact that the US and China made a deal in the current deteriorating strategic environment is a positive sign — cooperation is possible despite geopolitics. And this is especially unexpected as President Xi did not attend COP26, yet a sideline deal was made.

However, we should not be too optimistic about the future of bilateral relation. After all, climate change — or “climate crisis” as referenced in the Declaration — is the biggest challenge facing the world right now. So it is good to see that the two biggest emitters recognise the “seriousness and urgency of the climate crisis” and are committed to “tackling it to avoid catastrophic impacts”. 

Despite this, some skepticisms will remain regarding China’s commitment. However, on this, we believe the Chinese Government does intend to act — climate change is not just about looking good internationally, but also “sustained development of the Chinese nation”. The question is how fast and how far they go.

The Declaration covers issues such as methane, power generation, and deforestation. In practical terms, it flagged the establishment of a Working Group that will “meet regularly to address the climate crisis”. This provides a forum for continued engagement between the two governments.

And on that, we will hear the outcome from the first meeting (albeit virtual) between Xi and Biden soon.

The Declaration also highlighted the responsibilities of developed countries towards developing countries, including languages on “common but differentiated responsibilities” and the reference to the commitment “to address the needs of developing countries”.

This Declaration will likely mitigate some criticisms that China has been receiving about its inaction and Xi’s absence at COP26. For the Australian Government, this declaration may not be a good look for two reasons: 1) it draws more attention to Australia’s inaction, and 2) it shows that other countries with deteriorating relations with China can still make deals with it while Australia could not.

3. Keating speech

Yun here. Former Prime Minister of Australia Paul Keating’s speech has generated strong reactions in Australia. It was also talked about on Q&A, featuring yours truly:

Keating is known for using colour phrases and analogies. In this speech, he said the current vague plan for submarines is “like throwing a handful of toothpicks at the mountain”. He called certain journalists “ning-nongs” (a phrasing that I had to look up).

Overall, I agree with Keating’s critique of Australia’s foreign policy in general but disagree with his characterisation of the Chinese Government and the relationship with Taiwan.

On what I agree with. First, I agree that the Australian public debate and the government position is largely informed by the spooks. I have already observed this while working inside the government two years ago. In general, there is a lack of Asian literacy in the Australian public service (I wrote about this in the Lowy paper). 

Due to this lack of literacy, as well as the fact that “secrets” is seen as more exciting and trustworthy (they are not on both accounts), intelligence agencies play a larger role. The best thing about this is that intelligence officials can always rebut anyone’s questions with “but you don’t have the information I do”, and selectively leak intelligence to the press to back their claims and sway the public debate.

Second, I also agree that the government is not consistent on human rights. We know that the Modi regime is using similar tactics as the Xi regime to suppress dissent. Yet, the Australian Government would not criticise the Indian Government for human rights violations, because they’re seen as an ally in the effort to counter China. Human rights in China is considered a “strategic policy” while Modi is invited as a keynote speaker at a technology conference. 

But I’m sure if one day India was the one threatening the US primacy in Asia, we’d hear much more about human rights in India than in China. So human rights concerns are a symptom, not a cause, of the deteriorating relations.

On what I disagree with. I think Keating is too unrealistically optimistic about China’s current domestic trajectory. The Chinese Government has intensified crackdown on civil societies, including targeting human rights activists, feminist activists, LGBT groups, and labour activists. The Chinese Communist Party is centralising power away from businesses. It is enforcing a single party-approved view of history, where any history questioning the role of the Communist Party is banned.

And on Taiwan, I disagree with the characterisation that Taiwan is a civil matter internal to China. Taiwan has a separate political system that is democratic. It has a history longer than the People’s Republic, and it has successfully transitioned to democracy. Although it used to lobby other countries to be recognised as the true legitimate government of China, this has changed over time.

But what’s missing in the debate is the voice of people in Taiwan — we should at least acknowledge their views and preferences first.

4. Tennis

A follow up on the explosive but under-reported MeToo story. The Women’s Tennis Association, the governing body for professional tennis tours for women, has called for China to investigate the sexual assault allegations made by Peng Shuai against the former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhang Gaoli. It also called for an end to censorship of Peng:

Peng Shuai, and all women, deserve to be heard, not censored. Her accusation about the conduct of a former Chinese leader involving a sexual assault must be treated with the utmost seriousness. In all societies, the behavior she alleges that took place needs to be investigated, not condoned or ignored. We commend Peng Shuai for her remarkable courage and strength in coming forward. Women around the world are finding their voices so injustices can be corrected.

The governing body for men’s tennis has backed the WTA’s call.

No doubt this would have caused private fury inside the Chinese Government. This episode may affect the future of tennis in China.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

The Sixth Plenum is currently underway in Beijing and will run until Thursday. For background on plenums and how they fit into China’s political system, see our explainers (written | video) from last year.

The outcome of this Plenum is important to both policies in China as well as Xi’s prospects at the 20th Party Congress next year.

The most important outcome of the plenum will be the adoption of a resolution on history, the third in the Party’s history. The full title of the document is the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Century of Struggle 《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》. 

Why is history important? Frequent readers would know — we’ve harped on and on about the importance of historical narratives for understanding contemporary Chinese politics. In essence, history is not about the dusty past, it’s about the power to decide the future. 

For a summary of what will be in the resolution, read our translation of the October 18 Politburo meeting. In the words of the Politburo:

the Communist Party of China has faithfully carried out its original mission. It has united and led the people of all ethnicities in the country to paint a magnificent picture in the history of human development on the vast expanse of China.

The resolution will do three things. First, it will provide an overarching narrative about the past and a deterministic trajectory for China’s future: China has gone from weak to strong, and under the leadership of Xi will finally achieve its rightful place in the sun (and in doing so, end Chinese history).

Second, it will cement Xi’s role in the Party pantheon and help him retain his paramount position at the Party Congress next year.

Third, it will spell out a vision for the future, that is, strength on the international stage, and common prosperity at home.

We’ll update you later in the week when the outcomes of the Plenum are made public.

2. Pentagon assessment of the Chinese military

The Pentagon released its yearly assessment of the Chinese military last week. Here is the core message:

the PLA continue[s] to pursue its ambitious modernization objectives, refine major organizational reforms, and improve its combat readiness...This includes the PLA developing the capabilities to conduct joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces. In 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a new milestone for PLA modernization in 2027 broadly understood as the modernization of the PLA’s capabilities to be networked into a system of systems for “intelligentized” warfare. If realized, the PLA’s 2027 modernization goals could provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency.

While the continuing rapid modernisation of the PLA should be no surprise, what is surprising is recent assessments about China’s nuclear capabilities and force trajectory. The Pentagon estimates in the report that China may have 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and maybe aiming for at least 1000 warheads by 2030.

This is astonishing. Only last year, most open-source assessments put that number at around 300. In the past, China has built up its nuclear arsenal gradually, but now it seems to be rapidly modernising and expanding its nuclear forces.

There are two key reasons for this. First, China’s strategic environment has worsened, especially due to its intensifying geopolitical rivalry with the US. And second, Beijing is not confident about the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. This insecurity is driving it to upgrade its nuclear forces in the hope that it can more effectively deter others from using nuclear weapons against China.

The pace of China’s military modernisation is unlikely to slow down given Beijing’s insecurities and aspirations.

3. Focus on China

The deteriorating relationship between Australia and China has meant more focus on China in the media and in people’s minds. This is usually a good thing — it can lead to a better understanding of China, and for us personally, it can lead to more work.

However, such a focus on China purely from a geopolitical perspective can in fact be detrimental to our understanding of China. It can blind us from other perspectives as well as trends inside China, such as social movements. It can also lead to an easy caricature of Chinese people as a threat (unless they publicly and repeatedly disavow the CCP) rather than seeing them as individuals.

This week, the Australian Defence Minister urged France to focus on China instead of the submarine contract. In Glasgow, the Prime Minister made a (Freudian?) slip, saying “global momentum to tackle China” instead of “tackle climate change”.

For the government, China has become a bogeyman that can be called on to divert people’s attention. Relations with other countries? But they should focus on the China threat. Climate change? But China is emitting more. Human rights? But China is worse.

Identifying an external enemy is a common way to drum up nationalism — of course, China does it too. Such focus on an enemy can let the government get away from bad policies, including policies that are detrimental to liberal democratic values.

Yes, we need to pay attention to China, including the ugly aspects, such as its human rights. However, we should not see China purely from a geopolitical perspective. Just like we shouldn’t see India as an “alternative to China” or the Pacific as a “sphere of influence to be fought over with China” or Taiwan only from the “cross-strait relations” perspective.

Instead, we should see all these regions from a multitude of perspectives, and importantly, see them as groups of individuals, communities, and societies.

4. Esports

Last week, Shanghai-based team Edward Gaming (EDG) won the League of Legends (LoL) World Championship, beating last year’s winner Korean team DWG KIA. Two players on the EDG team are Koreans, one of them received the MVP award.

EDG has a close connection to the property industry in China — the owner is the son of the founder of a real estate company Hopson Development 合生创展.

To those who are uninitiated in esports, the eruption of celebration in China was surprising.

For many young men, esports is taken as seriously as traditional sports like professional football/soccer for older men. Players are treated like stars and there are professional commentators and rigorous training regimes for players. Like other sports, it takes skills and discipline to make it to the top while most players cannot hope to make a living from it.

There is a betting industry built around esports, as well as similar fan behaviours. Below, you can find fans gathering in celebration on the street at 2 am:

EDG’s win has even attracted coverage from Xinhua, the official media. Now, video gaming is seen as a “vice” by the government, with restrictions on online gaming for minors. But the national pride that is aroused, especially in young men, from this win is too good to pass. 

Additionally, esports will be in the Asian Games, hosted in Hangzhou next year, for the first time. Games include LoL, PUBG and Dota 2.

China has a huge gaming industry. Tencent, more well-known as the publisher of WeChat, is also the world’s largest video game vendor. In 2011, Tencent acquired Riot Games, the publisher of LoL. It also has a 40 per cent stake in Epic Games, publisher of Fortnite. In China, Honor of Kings 王者荣耀, a mobile game, has become one of the most popular games ever.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

1. UN

The UN system is very important to China, more so than for countries such as Australia. Last week, Xi marked China (PRC)’s 50th anniversary at the UN with a speech. In it, he called the UN resolution to recognise the PRC as one that “restored the legitimate membership at the UN” 恢复联合国合法席位.

“China” was actually a founding member of the UN. However, “China” was represented by the Republic of China at the UN until 1971, when PRC finally persuaded most of the countries to back it rather than the administration in Taiwan as the government of “China”, more than 20 years after the Civil War. Since then, Taiwan lost its representation at the UN, including the membership of the UN Security Council. Of course, any attempt now by Taiwan to join the UN as a separate country would be vigorously opposed by China.

The Chinese Government’s conception of a rules-based order is multilateralism centred around the UN, and is to be contrasted with a “US-led order”. This “UN-centred order” prioritises sovereignty and non-interference above anything else, including human rights and liberal values.

From its perspective, what countries like Australia call the rules-based order is just a “US-led order”. The invasion of countries without UN authorisation would be against its conception of rules-based order but is expected under the “US-led order”.

Its generally positive view of the UN contrasts with some countries’ view of the UN as a hugely inefficient global bureaucracy. China knows that it is currently not the top dog, so an “UN-centred order” is seen as a good alternative to the “US-led order”. Of course, if China was the most powerful country in the world, it would likely prefer a “China-led order” rather than an “UN-centred order”.

This admiration for a global bureaucracy is popularly reflected in many Chinese fiction and films. For example, in Wolf Warrior 2, an ultra-nationalistic film, the Chinese military would not act until it received authorisation from the UN Security Council. This would be inconceivable in American films. Putting aside whether such portrayal is realistic, it sends a message about the importance of the UN. In the Three Body Problem series, the UN also played a role by forming the Planetary Defense Council.

Due to the importance China attaches to the UN system, it has invested a lot of effort working the system, including lobbying members and vying for leadership positions. This has caused concern among countries about its influence in the UN. Its increasing influence is sometimes taken as another sign that the UN system is unworkable.

2. Resilience and dependence

Australia’s experience with economic coercion from China is being closely watched around the world. To understand power and leverage in a trading relationship, examining only current trade flow can be highly misleading. For example, just because China is Australia’s biggest export destination does not necessarily mean that Australia is “dependent” on China or that China has leverage over Australia. To really understand power and leverage, it is necessary to examine the market structure of different sectors.

This week, two new papers shed some light on this topic.

James Laurenceson, Thomas Pantle, Phillip Toner and Roy Green published a report on Australia’s export mix, industrial base and economic resilience. It found that Australia’s overall exposure to China is on par with other countries. The jump in exports to China between 2015 and 2020 was “overwhelmingly an iron ore price story”.

But Australia stands out in the goods export basket: Australia’s exports are heavily concentrated in primary goods. Yet this concentration in primary goods may have helped the Australian economy facing economic coercion from China, according to the next paper.

Scott Waldron, Victor Ferguson and Darren Lim authored a working paper on economic coercion. It examined nine Australian export sectors being sanctioned (informally) by China. For each of the sectors, the paper assessed the market dynamics (for example, market concentration) and what adjustments the Australian exporters made in the face of the sanctions.

According to the paper, the exporters used three ways to mitigate losses. The first one is the most well-known: reallocation. This is where the exporters find alternative customers. The paper found that reallocation was optimal, as it can be done in the short-term. In sectors where there are many customers, it is a lot easier for exporters to find customers. In contrast, if China was the dominant buyer, as is the case of lobsters, then it is harder for exporters to find alternative customers.

The paper also mentioned other factors contributing to the success of the reallocation method. One is the elasticity of supply. As global supply has not increased, the Australian exporters could find customers easily. Another factor is product homogeneity. The more homogenous the product, the easier reallocation.

The second way is “deflection”. This is where exporters try to circumvent sanctions through transhipment — also used in tariff evasion. In the nine sectors examined by the authors, the lobster industry was shown to have used this tactic. As China is a monopsony, it is not possible to export to other countries. Yet lobster is not a homogenous product and Chinese consumers have a distinct preference for Australian lobsters. 

As a result, lobsters were smuggled through Hong Kong. Of course, this tactic relies on Chinese authorities turning a blind eye to transhipment. Unfortunately, it appears Chinese consumers do not have a similar distinctive preference for Australian wines, which is shown to be easily substitutable for other wines.

The third way is “transformation”. This is where exporters try to transform the products into something that is not on the sanction list or produce something else entirely. For example, the paper found that barley farmers planted different crops and timber exporters processed logs into chips.

What can the government do to support exporters that are targeted for economic coercion? The authors wrote that:

The factors that make the Australian economy competitive are in many ways the factors that make it resilient. Exporters can diversify when conditions require it, provided they are globally competitive, and can access well-functioning global markets.

The international system that supports global markets – open economies and consistent rules and institutions – is therefore critical to Australia’s success. Policies that encourage economic closure, or challenge the rules-based system, potentially undermine resilience.

So for governments, the best way to insure against economic coercion is to make the economy competitive and to support an open rules-based system. In the face of economic coercion, governments may be tempted to encourage economic closure to stop trade dependence. But this is exactly the wrong thing to do.

3. Chinese Australians

It’s report season in Australia it seems. Jennifer Hsu, Richard McGregor and Natasha Kassam just published an analysis on Chinese community organisations in Australia.

The key findings include: many Chinese Australians had little or no engagement with Chinese community organisations, and attacks on the community in Australia in some cases made them more receptive to messages critical of Australia.

While they’re not surprising to regular Neican readers, they may be surprising to those who view Chinese Australians solely from the lens of foreign interference and threats posed by the CCP’s united front.

The section that interested me the most was on participation in public life. As one of the few Chinese Australians who participate in public discussions about bilateral relations, I want to foster an environment where more Chinese Australians can do the same.

According to the report, many Chinese Australians interviewed said entering politics was a risky venture. They’re deeply impacted by the distrust of Chinese Australians: “People might point to me being photographed with this or that person.” The authors wrote:

This perceived distrust in Australia of Chinese-Australians may in fact work in China’s favour, further dislocating those people from Australian society and fostering more support for China’s political agenda.

Unfortunately, I have found that simply saying “distrusting Chinese Australians is bad for social cohesion and we shouldn’t do it” is not persuasive enough for most people. The only way that we can prompt any actions is to point to the fact that such distrust can be used by China.

“Social cohesion” by itself is not an issue that resonates with the policy community in Canberra — only by framing issues in foreign interference and national security terms can we see possible action.

4. Songs

A song in Mandarin has reached 22 million views on YouTube in just two weeks. The song is called Fragile 玻璃心 by Malaysian singer-songwriter Namewee 黃明志 and features Chinese Australian singer Kimberley Chen 陳芳語. It went viral among Chinese-speaking countries outside the PRC. Inside the PRC, it was banned, and the artists’ social media accounts were removed.

The song mocks the PRC nationalists online (colloquially called “little pink” 小粉红), alongside some of Xi’s signature policies.

In an interview with the Bang Xiao (ABC), Chen said:

I really hope that in the future, Australia will [provide] more opportunities for Asian actors and singers and celebrities in general. I feel like there's so much talent out there. And I hope that everyone has a platform and an opportunity to express and show their talent.

The Chinese Government, on the other hand, is promoting a video called 中美抗疫差距唱出来 The difference between Chinese and American approaches to COVID in song. The video features a woman playing two roles doing a rap battle against each other in English: one role as a blonde woman representing the US approach to COVID and one role as a nurse representing the Chinese approach to COVID. The video accuses the US of scapegoating China while doing nothing to contain COVID, and ends with “This is the freedom of America”.

Although the video is entirely in English, it did not go viral outside China. Authoritarianism and censorship are detrimental to soft power indeed.

5. MeToo

This is more in the breaking news territory. Famous Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai 彭帅 has alleged on Weibo that she was sexually assaulted by Zhang Gaoli 张高丽, member of the Politburo Standing Committee from 2012 to 2017.

This is the most high-profile sexual assault allegation so far. The Weibo post was promptly censored along with any reference to the matter. However, online discussions are continuing with commentators trying to avoid the censors.

Such an allegation is unlikely to ever be proven in China. And it is so surprising because it would take so much courage and bravery for the allegation to be made. Going against a senior CCP official (who is not already in trouble with the CCP) can ruin Peng’s life.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

The Chinese Government is getting very serious about climate change. A few days ago (just before the Glasgow Climate Change Conference), the Central Committee and the State Council jointly released Working Guidance For Carbon Dioxide Peaking And Carbon Neutrality In Full And Faithful Implementation Of The New Development Philosophy 关于完整准确全面贯彻新发展理念做好碳达峰碳中和工作的意见 [English | Chinese].

As Xi is not attending the climate conference, this can be read as China’s action and response to the global challenge of climate change.

Commitments

From the start, to underscore the importance of the issue, the document emphasised that achieving peak carbon emissions 碳达峰 and carbon neutrality 碳中和 is a “major strategic decision” 重大战略决策. The domestic justification is that it is necessary to achieve “sustained development of the Chinese nation”, 实现中华民族永续发展, thus linking carbon policy to national rejuvenation. So it would be inconceivable for people in China, including local officials, to go against the major strategic decision that affects the sustainability of the Chinese nation.

The document sets out concrete qualitative and quantitative targets, including (but not limited to):

By 2025:

• Energy consumption per GDP will be 13.5% lower than 2020 level

• Carbon emissions per GDP will be 18% lower than 2020 level

• Non-fossil energy consumption will reach around 20%

By 2030:

• Energy efficiency in key energy-consuming industries will reach advanced international levels

• Carbon emissions per GDP will drop by more than 65% compared with 2005 level

• Non-fossil energy consumption will reach around 25%

By 2060:

• Energy efficiency will be at the advanced international level

• Non-fossil energy consumption will be over 80%

• Successfully achieve carbon neutral

The document is far-reaching — it affects numerous policy areas including investment, financing, and tax; and it covers industrial restructuring, energy industry, transportation industry, rural development, and research and technology industries.

To demonstrate commitment, the document also highlights oversight and performance assessments 监督考核. For example, it is explicit that all local authorities must build targets for carbon peaking and neutrality, and that performance assessment is to be strengthened, including that “outstanding regions, organizations, and individuals to be duly rewarded and commended and regions and departments that fail to accomplish their goals and tasks to be criticised”. This should be a strong incentive for local authorities to ensure their carbon targets are achieved. It may even lead to over-achievement at the expense of other priorities.

In contrast to what people may have expected from recent power shortage, the Government is strengthening dual-controls over energy intensity and gross energy consumption 能源消费强度和总量双控, and this includes stepping up supervision and law enforcement 监察和执法. Regions in danger of missing targets will face delay or restrictions of project approvals 缓批限批.

Specific industries

The document outlines restrictions to be placed on energy-intensive and high-emission industries 高耗能高排放 as well as inducements to developing green and low-carbon industries 绿色低碳产业. The Government has committed to strictly controlling investment in high-carbon products while increasing support for energy conservation projects. The sector-by-sector intervention is one of the heavier state directions.

For example, authorities will continue to conduct “look back” inspection of steel and coal overcapacity 钢铁煤炭去产能“回头看”, in order to prevent overcapacity from phenoxing. For industries such as steel and cement, capacity substitutions will be implemented at equal or reduced levels. And oil refinery operations, unless listed in national industrial plans, are prohibited from new construction or expansion.

For the power generation sector, the document has indicated that China will look to more market-based solutions 市场化改革 to improve the national unified energy market 能源统一市场. The fragmentation of regional markets was one of the reasons for the recent power shortages. The document has also banned the practice of giving preferential electricity pricing to energy-intensive and emission-intensive industries.

On the other hand, China will focus on developing “strategic emerging industries” 战略性新兴产业, which includes next-generation information technology, biotechnology, new energy, new materials, high-end equipment, new energy vehicles, environmental protection, aerospace, and marine equipment. However, China is facing increasing international concerns and resistance regarding its progress in these emerging technology industries.

International dimension

China is still eager to remind other countries of its developing country status, hence its adherence to the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities 共同但有区别的责任. This means other countries should not expect China to share the global burden as a developed economy.

On trade, China has committed to regulating exports of energy-intensive and high-emission products and expanding imports of green and low-carbon products. Historically, as the world’s factory, much of the exports was in highly-polluting industries that developed countries did not produce themselves. Restrict exporting energy-intensive industries requires a restructuring of the economy, which China is looking to do. 

However, internationally, this means that China will increasingly compete with developed economies rather than complement their economies. Over time, trade may become less of ballast to tension in political relationships.

On foreign investment, China will strive to make green the defining colour of BRI 让绿色成为共建“一带一路”的底色. As a major financier of infrastructure internationally, this has the potential to significantly reduce global emissions if implemented strictly.

2. History in the making

Last week, the Politburo examined the issue of comprehensively summarising the major achievements and historical experience of the Party’s century of struggle. (Adam’s translation of the meeting outcome here). The draft resolution will be submitted to the Central Committee in November.

As we have emphasised repeatedly, history is important for the CCP. A verdict on history does not only impact how history is narrated and taught but also the future trajectory of the country. Xi has been active in cracking down on so-called “historical nihilism”. So the resolution on history is a big deal, and it has only been done twice before — once in 1945 before the establishment of PRC and once under Deng in 1981, which passed a verdict on the Cultural Revolution.

Just as an illustrative example, the official China Internet Rumour Refuting Platform was launched in July targetting rumours that “smear party history”, including “revolutionary leaders, heroic figures and historical events”.

Among the “top 10 rumours” to be combatted include:

• Mao is not the real author of a poem

• Mao’s son was exposed and subsequently killed in the Korean War because he was making egg fried rice

• Lei Feng’s diary is fake

• The CCP did not fight against Japan 

• Land reform was wrong and the landlords were actually nice people

• The USA did not plan to attack China during the Korean War

We are against this kind of state enforcement of historical narrative, so we are proudly “historical nihilists”.

Yet, some jurisdictions in liberal democracies are also going down this road well-trodden by the CCP. This mostly manifests in how history is taught in schools. For example, Texas, a place I lived for a year, has banned the teaching of “critical race theory” — they may as well branded it “historical nihilism” — and has legislated to promote “patriotic education” (no need for a name change here).

In Australia, the federal Minister for Education has criticised the history curriculum. He said the curriculum “has a negative view of our history” and “downplayed our Western heritage”. Instead, he seems to want to instil patriotic education with positive energy: “Ultimately, students should leave school with a love of country and a sense of optimism and hope that we live in the greatest country on earth”.

What the Australian Minister of Education proposes is basically what the CCP has done… instilling/indoctrinating a love for the country so that future generations will “defend it as previous generations did”.

There are more similarities between some right-wing parties in liberal democracies and the left-wing CCP than meets the eye.

3. Digicel

Speaking of Australia imitating China… Back in July, I wrote:

Australian taxpayers may end up funding the purchase of Digicel Pacific, a telecommunications company servicing the Pacific and owned by an Irish billionaire. The reason behind the taxpayer funding is all about China — concerns that China might buy it.

Now the Australian Government has announced that the taxpayers will be helping Telstra, a private Australian company, to acquire Digicel from the Irish billionaire.

The Australian Government said this “enables Telstra to take this commercial opportunity”. Of course, this deal is not purely commercial — if it was, then Telstra would not need help from the government. Instead, the deal is more importantly part of “Australia’s longstanding commitment to growing quality investment in regional infrastructure”.

From an aid effectiveness’s point of view, the question is whether this is the most effective and efficient way to help the Pacific countries? On this, Stephen Howes is sceptical:

Many will welcome the investment as a sign of Australian commitment to the Pacific. However, if we want to invest in the telecom sector in the Pacific, we should be backing alternatives to Digicel, to push prices down and improve services, not buying out the dominant player. [...]

The Australian government also needs to decide if its only goal is to counter China or if it still seeks to promote Pacific development.

This sort of government-private partnership to fund overseas acquisition is quite normal for China. The Chinese Government often directs Chinese companies (mostly state-owned enterprises) to invest in particular projects, sometimes for geopolitical reasons.

But as Shahar Hameiri noted, 

The Telstra decision is the clearest indication yet that Australia’s hand-off approach to its firms’ activities abroad is being supplanted by more active direction of outbound investment and development financing.

For me, this appears to be another case where Australia is concerned about China’s actions (government supporting foreign acquisitions), and counter this by doing exactly what China has done.

4. Approved news

The Cyberspace Administration of China updated its list of approved “internet news source” 互联网新闻信息稿源单位名单. Only news sources on the list can be republished by internet platforms. The current list contains 1358 news sources.

The focus of the update notice is on “positive energy”. That is, the regulator wants internet news sources to promote positive news about the country and the party. The update added news sources that were politically correct 政治方向 and removed news sources that had “poor day-to-day performance” 日常表现不佳.

Most notably, Caixin 财新, China’s best known non-government news source, was removed from the list. Among other “non-positive” news it published was its investigation on COVID death numbers in Wuhan in March 2020.

Removing Caixin from the list means internet platforms cannot re-publish content from Caixin. Normally this can significantly reduce the influence of the news outlet, as many readers get news through aggregators rather than go to the source directly. However, in Caixin’s case, it has been behind a paywall since 2017, which means readers would have to go to the source directly anyway.

Overall, this development is another sign that the party-state is tightening control on information in the country. It is strengthening its “guidance” to ensure only positive news about the party is reported.

So for readers of news from China, we may have to be even more sceptical and critical about the framing of most news stories.

5. Li Yundi

Social media in China exploded this week with the news that the famous pianist Li Yundi 李云迪 has been detained for soliciting a prostitute. Li is a “celebrity” on the level of a pop star, despite being a concert pianist.

As regular readers of Neican know, the Chinese Government and the Communist Party is cracking down on celebrities recently. And one target of the crackdown is “immoral” (not just illegal) behaviours of celebrities. In this case, prostitution and soliciting prostitution are both illegal (along with pornography) in China. However, prostitution is still rampant in China, and most do not get into serious trouble for it.

On social media, the platforms have allowed some comments questioning his detention, with many criticising the lack of privacy afforded to him and disputing whether punishment should be imposed for prostitution in the first place. Speculations are also rife as to why he was targeted, as one would expect many celebrities to engage in similar acts. 

Despite prostitution being a relatively minor crime (around two weeks in detention), Li’s career has been destroyed by this revelation.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

I haven’t been writing about the human rights situation in Hong Kong for a while. This is because every time there is an update or development on this topic, it invariably means a deterioration, such as more activists arrested or an even more stringent crackdown.

In February 2020 at an event for La Trobe Asia, I made a pessimistic prediction that Hong Kong will end up like any other city in China when it comes to human rights and democracy. The passage of the national security law in June 2020 accelerated that trend.

Just an illustrative example. Hong Kong used to be the only place in China that allowed for the commemoration of the 1989 protest and massacre. In other parts of China, individuals and groups may commemorate in private, but in Hong Kong, it used to attract a large number of participants. This year’s anniversary was the first one after the passage of the national security law, and so no large-scale commemorative activities took place in Hong Kong for the first time.

Last month, Hong Kong police raided the June 4 Museum (六四紀念館), after closing it down in June. Activists were also arrested, with many pleading guilty to charges under the national security law.

This month, the University of Hong Kong ordered the removal of the sculpture named Pillar of Shame from the campus, where it has been for 24 years. The sculpture commemorates the 1989 massacre.

Universities are supposed to be the bastion of free speech and liberal values. But under the national security law, voices pushing for democracy have been gradually silenced in Hong Kong, including at universities. For now, the sculpture has remained after a public outcry, with the university stating that it is seeking “legal advice”. But with continuous crackdowns, it is little temporary comfort.

Protest in Greece

Joey Siu, a Hong Kong activist was arrested in Athens alongside a Tibetan activist Tsela Zoksang, for protesting against the Beijing Winter Olympics. They attempted to hang banners and flags related to Hong Kong and Tibet from a scaffold in the Acropolis. For this, they were arrested “for violating the law on protection of archaeological sites”.

Is this an example of China “exporting” its authoritarian system or human rights violations? Greece is seen as one of the countries in Europe that are relatively “pro-China”, with the Piraeus Port being a critical BRI “flagship” project.

However, in this case, it is likely that if the protest was for some other cause, the protestors would still have been arrested. If that is the case, then it should not be seen as China exporting authoritarianism, since Greece would be treating all protestors the same, no matter which country they’re protesting against.

It is understandable that the activists are protesting against the Chinese Government outside China to gain international attention. After all, it’s not possible to protest in China, not even in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, the International Olympics Committee has not been a fan of any kind of protests. It has always been more sympathetic to governments than human rights groups. However, as the activists arrested are US citizens, the US would likely ensure that they receive proper consular assistance.

2. Common prosperity

Qiushi published an article titled To Firmly Drive Common Prosperity, based on Xi Jinping’s speech at the 10th meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. As this is the most authoritative and detailed articulation of common prosperity so far, it is worth reading in full.

If you can’t read Chinese, you can find Adam Ni’s translation here.

The first thing to note is that the concept of “common prosperity” still retains a strong “neoliberal” bent. Despite the Communist Party’s emphasis on socialism and pathway to communism, the article is forthright that it does NOT mean “egalitarianism” (整齐划一的平均主义). Later on, the article cautioned that “we must resolutely prevent [ourselves] from falling into the trap of nurturing lazy people through ‘welfarism’.” (坚决防止落入“福利主义”养懒汉的陷阱).

Xi still praises the role of “leaders of wealth acquisition” (致富带头人), but now also emphasise that those who got rich first must help those who are not yet rich (先富带后富、帮后富). Rich individuals and companies should be encouraged “give more back to society” (更多回报社会). Of course, how this is implemented is crucial — is encouragement more inducements or threats?

Second, the motivation for common prosperity is the experience of richer countries. “Some developed countries have been industrialising for hundreds of years, but due to their social systems, they have not solved the problem of common prosperity and, in fact, the problem of disparity between the rich and the poor has worsened.”

From the article, it seems to refer to the US — “the polarisation of rich and poor and the collapse of the middle class has led to social disintegration, political polarisation, and rampant populism” (一些国家贫富分化，中产阶层塌陷，导致社会撕裂、政治极化、民粹主义泛滥).

Third, policy areas that come under the common prosperity concept are wide-ranging. It includes reform of monopolistic sectors, development of finance and real estate to be more reflective of the real economy, reform of the hukou (household registration) system for children of internal migrants, and broadening the scope of consumption tax.

Fourth, interestingly the article touched on performance measures. For example, “it is inappropriate to put forward uniform quantitative targets” (统一的量化指标). Further, common prosperity should not be “applied in a way that divides urban and rural areas, or eastern, central and western regions, with each proposing its own indicators”. (各提各的指标).

This is likely a result of past experiences of local officials manipulating data in order to achieve a set quantitative target. Unfortunately, the article did not mention the alternative to output targets for measuring the performance of local officials. In a top-down system without democratic oversight, how local officials’ performance is measured will be crucial in how a central policy will be implemented.

3. Social media platforms

LinkedIn

Microsoft’s LinkedIn is exiting (substantially changing its operation in) China, after years of controversy. Before this, LinkedIn was the most prominent non-Chinese social media platform to operate across the jurisdiction. However, to operate in China, it had to abide by the government’s strict censorship requirements. 

In the statement announcing the exit, LinkedIn cited “more challenging operating environment and greater compliance requirements”.

A few weeks ago, LinkedIn sent messages to some journalists who worked in China informing them that their profiles are unviewable from China. This has raised concerns of censorship, even though the profiles are still viewable outside China.

LinkedIn’s dilemma highlights the experience of social media companies trying to operate across the Great Fire Wall. To operate in China, they have to censor on behalf of the Chinese Government. But if they do, then they get criticised outside China for censorship. For LinkedIn, it never reached a high level of market penetration inside China, so it decided to forgo the Chinese market.

To manage the competing demands across jurisdictions, ByteDance separated its TikTok operation from its Douyin operation. TikTok’s data is stored in servers in Singapore and the US while Douyin’s data is stored in servers in China. The two apps operate independently — it’s not possible to access Douyin content from TikTok. The company has maintained that it is not censoring on behalf of the Chinese Government for TikTok, only for Douyin.

However, despite this arrangement, there are still concerns that the algorithms for TikTok could be used for censorship purposes. And algorithmic recommendations are non-transparent (not just for TikTok, but also for Facebook and YouTube), where platforms could influence and guide users towards a certain political view.

WeChat

One social media platform that has straddled across the Great Fire Wall so far is Wexin/WeChat. Unlike Douyin/TikTok, which is seen as entertainment, Wexin/WeChat is seen as more for interpersonal communication, a purpose that is more essential than entertainment. 

If a separation between Wexin and WeChat was strictly enforced, then accounts registered outside China would not be able to communicate with accounts registered inside China. This would affect people outside China with strong family or business connections inside China.

Even for accounts registered outside China, the content they see on WeChat is still censored — even though WeChat censors the two types of accounts differently. However, because the market penetration of WeChat outside China is quite niche — it hasn’t managed to reach those without strong connections to China, most jurisdictions have not rushed to pressure WeChat to change, despite many voicing concerns. WeChat is not going to stop censoring due to external pressure and banning WeChat over censorship would not be politically popular.

Recently WeChat is trying to draw a clearer line between domestic and international accounts, due to China’s Personal Information Protection Law. Despite this change, it’s unlikely that WeChat will stop censoring content seen by overseas registered accounts. This is because it is almost impossible for WeChat to delineate the two types of accounts when they exist on the same platform.

4. Marriages

The Communist Youth League has conducted a survey of almost 3000 unmarried urban youth aged 18-26 on their attitude towards marriages and relationships. The survey found that 44 per cent of (urban young) women plan to never marry or are unsure whether they will marry. This contrasts with the equivalent figure for men at 25 per cent. In addition, those in more economically developed areas are less likely to want to get married.

The survey found that the top reason for women not wanting to get married is “not wanting children” (69 per cent). The article blames the rise of “individualism” for much of the attitude change —  young people want to spend time and energy on individual development and hobbies rather than raising the next generation.

Many governments encourage their population to form stable relationships (usually in the form of marriage) and have children above the population replacement rate. Partly this is because people in stable relationships with children are less likely to revolt against the government. Instead, they become more risk-averse and tend to want to steadily advance in their career to provide for the next generation.

But as the population becomes richer, they tend to want fewer children and also marry less. This trend is consistent with what’s happening in developed countries, including in Japan and Korea. Partly this is because women have more choice, and therefore the opportunity cost of having children is higher if the social system still presents high barriers for women to advance in career when they have children.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

Two recently published papers shed some insights on Chinese-language media in Australia: Waning Sun’s journal article “Chinese-language digital news media in Australia” published in June in Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies and Fan Yang’s analysis “Translating tension” published last week by the Lowy Institute.

Sun focused her research on Sydney Today, while Yang looked at Daily Chinese Herald, Australian Chinese Daily and Media Today (parent company of Sydney Today) on two case studies: trade disputes, and Zhao Lijian’s “Afghan child” tweet.

Chinese-language media has come under the spotlight in recent years predominantly as a “national security concern”, particularly a “foreign interference concern”. The worry is that the Chinese Communist Party could use Chinese-language media to promote their foreign policy agenda. However, like on all issues, we must take a broader lens than just “national security” to really understand the scope and scale of the problem.

First, according to Sun’s research, “hard news” — that is, politics, economics, trade and foreign policy — represents a very small percentage of news covered by Sydney Today, in contrast to what most people may think what “news” should look like.

Instead, a typical popular news story is about cultural differences and often contains narratives such as “Chinese people behaving badly”, with quotes from English-language media serving as evidence of contempt from “mainstream society” of “Chinese people”. This then generates outrage and a sense of superiority from readers who are more “established” Chinese Australians, often siding with “mainstream society” and eager to delineate themselves from “new arrivals” or “Chinese people in China”.

Here we see it’s not a simple story of “us” vs “them” or China vs Australia. But it often devolves to “us” (established Chinese Australian migrants) trying to navigate between “mainstream society” and “Chinese people in China or new arrivals”.

Second, most of the stories are translations and compilations of stories from other sources rather than original stories. Sun found that compilations comprise 57 per cent of Sydney Today news stories whereas original items only comprise 5 per cent. And of the compilation items about Australia, 91 per cent came from English-language Australian media and government organisations. Yang found similar results, with only 2.2 per cent of the sample being original content.

This means the media organisations do not support journalists and reporters, but rely on curators 小编 who focus on selecting the topic and making the content appeal to the target audience — first-generation Chinese migrants. So the role played by these media organisations is very different. The line between “news” and “editorials” is also more blurred.

Readers of Neican probably are more interested in implications for politics and foreign policy. According to Yang:

Chinese-language media outlets in Australia are more likely to implicitly support Australian government policy than Chinese government policy when reporting on Australia–China tensions, despite published content often being moderated to remove direct criticism of China and the Chinese government.

And in a survey of 600 first-generation migrants from China, Sun found that “there is a high level of ambivalence about both Australia and China”.

So it appears that the scope and scale of CCP interference in Chinese-language media are rather limited. First, most news stories are not concerned about ‘hard news’ such as bilateral relationship, but rather cover topics that are pertinent to the first generation Chinese Australian community, such as crime. Of course, bilateral relationship is also a more sensitive topic, so their lack of coverage could be due both to market force and censorship pressure.

And for news articles on bilateral relationship, Chinese-language media in Australia overall did not “pick a side”. Yang found that “there is no single or consistent perspective being presented by these media outlets”. Sun also found that first-generation migrants from China do not unquestioningly accept the Chinese government narrative. This contrasts with the prevailing narrative that CCP has “infiltrated” Chinese-language media in Australia.

You may have noticed that this section is also a “compilation” with me playing the role of 小编 (curator). But what is 小编? Who is 小编? What is the meaning and origin of 小编?

Censorship in media

Both Sun and Yang’s research points out that self-censorship is one of the pressures facing Chinese-language media in Australia, especially for media that publishes content on WeChat. These media organisations regularly soften or remove criticism of China and the Chinese government.

Although self-censorship pressures have not led to a uniform pro-Beijing editorial stance, national security analysts are right in pointing out that such self-censorship still poses a problem for freedom of speech in Australia.

Yet when faced with evidence of even more blatant incidents of censorship by a foreign government last week, Australia’s national security community is eerily silent about the foreign interference risks.

In Dateline Jerusalem: Journalism’s Toughest Assignment, John Lyons write:

This book is the story of why many editors and journalists in Australia are in fear of upsetting these people and therefore, in my view, self-censoring. It’s the story of how the Israeli-Palestinian issue is the single issue which the media will not cover with the rigour with which it covers every other issue. And, most importantly, it’s the story of how the Australian public is being short-changed — denied reliable, factual information about one of the most important conflicts of our time.

According to Jennine Khalik, a Palestinian Australian journalist, she was the subject of meetings between Israeli diplomats and editors at The Australian, and subsequently, she was moved to the Arts section so that she would not report on anything Palestine.

Now Chinese-language media affects around 4 per cent of Australians who speak a Chinese language at home. The scope of foreign interference detailed in Lyon’s book is far more significant, as it affects “mainstream media”, so that’s nearly every Australian.

Foreign interference and impediments to freedom of speech, including self-censorship, should be a problem no matter where the source of pressure is. Yet in the current public debate in Australia, “foreign interference” and “threat to freedom of speech” is usually only used when China is in the discussion.

This appears to be another instance where the government and national security community only pays attention to a problem when it has connections to China, rather than dealing with the issue more comprehensively.

2. US-China trade

It looks like trade policy under Biden is a continuation of Trump’s policy — it’s still very much “America first”. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has pledged to keep pressuring Beijing to commit to the “Phase 1” trade deal, including the purchase agreement.

Tai said, “above all else, we must defend – to the hilt – our economic interests”.

As I’ve noted before, if China commits to the purchase agreement under the “Phase 1” trade deal, it will reduce China’s purchase of goods and services from other countries. This in effect means China must discriminate against other countries in favour of the US when importing. On this issue, the economic interest of the US is against the interest of many of its allies, despite Tai’s rhetoric of “collaboration with other economies and countries”.

As illustrated previously, China’s import of American agricultural products has already increased due to its sanction of Australian agricultural products, especially beef and lobsters. However, such an increase is still not enough to reach the “Phase 1” commitments.

On the other hand, the focus on China’s “non-market trade practices” would be more popular with other countries. Yet, as the US is criticising China’s industrial policies, the administration is also implementing its own industrial policies.

Overall, Tai’s speech indicates that the US is not pursuing general economic decoupling, as it is still trying to push for market access into China, which leads to more, not less, trade and economic linkages. 

3. BRI debt

AidData, an international development research lab at William & Mary (a university in the US), has found a major increase in “hidden debt” in BRI projects, after analysing 13,427 Chinese development projects:

nearly 70% of China’s overseas lending is now directed to state-owned companies, state-owned banks, special purpose vehicles, joint ventures, and private sector institutions in recipient countries. These debts, for the most part, do not appear on their government balance sheets. However, most of them benefit from explicit or implicit forms of host government liability protection, which has blurred the distinction between private and public debt

This means previous official data on debt has undercounted debt obligations to China. And the “hidden debt” problem is getting worse.

The “hidden debt” problem is detrimental to global debt transparency. Opacity in debt creates unclear financial risks. Furthermore, it may affect global efforts on debt service suspension. China, a major world creditor, has not joined the Paris Club, a group of creditor countries that coordinates debt relief. It would not be fair for Paris Club members to provide debt relief only so that the debtor country can meet its obligation to China.

The report also reveals the extent that poorer countries have to rely on China for financing. China is outspending the US on a more than 2-to-1 basis. This means for countries that seek financing, there is little alternative available. It would be difficult for other countries to match China in the level of financing (for example under the Build Back Better World initiative). 

Countries may be better off competing with China on quality rather than quantity, that is, with a focus on governance and standards. However, for countries desperate for financing, this is unlikely a priority.

4. Taiwan

In recent weeks, China has been flying warplanes into Taiwan’s southwest “air defence identification zone”:

These flights are intended to provoke. But what is China trying to achieve through this provocative action? These flights move public sentiments within Taiwan even further away from China. Internationally, countries around the world are more sympathetic to Taiwan’s plight and see this as bullying by a great power. Within China, these flights are not being publicly promoted, so there is no benefit from the rise in nationalism.

According to Wen-Ti Sung, many Taiwanese do not see the flights as a preparation for invasion. He argues that these flights are part of a tactic to deter Taiwan from declaring independence:

One explanation is Beijing places a higher priority on deterring Taiwan’s further movement towards independence than promoting unification, so it is willing to trade the latter for the former. In other words, Beijing may simply not be as zealous about pursuing unification in the near-term.

Instead, keeping an eye on the long game, Beijing is willing to risk short- to medium-term costs in losing hearts and minds in Taiwan. The hope is, in time, it can eventually regain the initiative. For this reason, being able to deter further movement towards independence may be sufficient to buy China much-needed time.

This explanation postulates that China is continuing its past strategy of kicking the can down the road. As long as Taiwan doesn’t “declare independence”, China is prepared to wait. For this to work, both China and Taiwan need to believe that time is on their side. It is probably in the interest of the world that they both continue to wait for now.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were finally released this week, after being arrested and detained in China for almost three years. The release of these two Canadians occurred at the same time as the release by Canada of Meng Wanzhou 孟晚舟, the CFO of Huawei and the daughter of Huawei’s founder. This “prisoner exchange”-like deal was done between three governments — the US, Canada and China.

Unlike Meng, who still enjoyed luxury and much freedom while under house arrest in her mansion, the two Canadians were treated like other Chinese prisoners, which meant harsh conditions.

A dance of three countries

The two Canadians were detained by the Chinese Government in 2018 in retaliation for Canada’s detention of Meng. Unlike other foreigners detained in China, the detention of these two Canadians was blatantly related to Meng — this is why they’re often referred to as “hostages”. However, Chinese officials have denied this.

As for Meng, she was detained in Canada, not because she violated Canadian laws, but because Canada has an extradition treaty with the US, and the US has requested the extradition of Meng on charges related to US sanctions against Iran. Note that Meng was not accused of violating any Canadian sanctions.

This means it is mostly up to the US whether Meng can be released, even though it is Canada that detained her. And in retaliation, China detained two Canadian citizens (rather than US citizens) to pressure Canada. Canada is being squeezed in the middle, with devastating personal consequences for the two Canadians.

Hostage diplomacy

Prisoner exchanges have been a common practice between countries in war, most notably between Israel and Arab countries. Last year, Australian citizen Kylie Moore-Gilbert was released from Iran, in a similar prisoner exchange situation where three Iranians were released at the same time.

Exchange deals like this raise “moral hazard” questions. China will see this deal as successful use of “hostage diplomacy”. So it may be encouraged to use the same tactic in the future when its valued citizens are detained by another country. This means all foreign citizens in China could be at an increased risk when bilateral relations deteriorate.

Of course, the chances of any one individual in China being arbitrarily arrested and held as a hostage is still low. There are many Americans, Canadians, and Australians in China, either on business or otherwise. But the risk is present and may have increased as a result of this deal.

As for the two Australians currently detained in China — Cheng Lei and Yang Hengjun — the latest deal does not signal much. With the two Canadians, the motivation behind their arrests was quite clear (despite the Chinese Government’s denial) and therefore the “price” for them to get released is also clear. But that’s not the case with Cheng or Yang.

For China’s elites, on the other hand, Meng’s arrest may have sounded a caution to avoid countries with extradition treaties with the US.

The narrative in China

The state media has heavily promoted Meng’s return to China as a “positive energy” story of the Chinese Government’s successful efforts to secure her release. Meng was welcomed back with a huge welcoming party at the airport. In contrast, the release of the two Canadians was barely covered in the Chinese media.

In the Chinese Government’s narrative, Meng was wrongfully detained — that she was detained as a way to punish Huawei and to contain China’s progress. So in this narrative, Meng was a political prisoner.

The message the government is promoting from Meng’s release is similar to the one at the end of Wolf Warrior 2 film:

This messaging promotes patriotism among the population — that the country is now powerful enough to stand up to other countries, and therefore Chinese citizens can rely on the government to look after their interests overseas.

However, I’m sceptical of the effectiveness of this message. While most people in China do want China to become powerful and want the government to protect them while overseas, they also understand Meng is not an ordinary Chinese citizen. Meng is a Huawei “princess”, and people expect her to get special treatment. What’s the chance that the Chinese government would go to the same length for a commoner?

2. Power rations

It’s not yet proper winter in China, but there are already large-scale power outages (also affecting water supply) in Northeast China (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang), the coldest part of China. Due to capacity constraints in the region, the authorities have implemented emergency power rationing. 

One of the reasons cited for low capacity is coal shortage. The other is to meet “dual control” targets 双控目标 — energy intensity and energy consumption targets.

Coal price

Global coal price has grown significantly this year. Thermal coal price at Newcastle Port has risen 50 per cent in just three months, just short of the record set in 2008. This is due to both supply and demand — demand for energy has grown as economies recover while supply is still constrained due to the pandemic.

Of course, China’s trade action against imports of coal from Australia has exacerbated the problem.

Yet, electricity prices are capped by local authorities in China. So with rising input prices but fixed output prices, generating electricity has become less profitable — it may even become a loss-making venture.

Since raising electricity prices may lead to more social discontent than rationing electricity, especially among households, the authorities have opted to restrict demand for electricity through rationing.

Energy targets

A year ago at the UN General Assembly, Xi made an announcement that China will aim to hit peak emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. Last week at the same forum, Xi also committed to not building new coal-fired power projects abroad, underscoring China’s commitment to more actions on climate change.

Even before these announcements, China has had a national target for reductions in energy consumption. As usual with these national targets, each province is then allocated a provincial target. So the power rationing may partly be due to attempts by local and provincial governments to reach the energy reduction targets for the year. 

However, the impact of these targets on rationing is unclear, as provinces that are set to reach their targets have also implemented electricity rationing.

3. Cryptocurrency

Eleven agencies (National Development and Reform Commission, Central Propaganda Department, Central Cyberspace Affair Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, State Taxation Administration, State Administration for Market Regulation, Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, and National Energy Bureau) have issued a notice on the regulation of the mining of cryptocurrency.

A week before that, ten agencies (People’s Bank of China, Central Cyberspace Affair Commission, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Market Regulation, and Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, Securities Regulatory Commission, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange) also issued a notice on preventing speculatory risks in cryptocurrency trading.

The two notices effectively banned the mining and trading of cryptocurrencies in China. The fact that so many agencies are involved shows the party and the government are determined to act on cryptocurrency, so strict enforcement is likely. As the latest development follows previous crackdowns on cryptocurrencies in China, this is not surprising.

For governments around the world, cryptocurrencies pose many regulatory challenges, including compliances with money laundering, tax avoidance, and counter-terrorism laws. Compared to other countries, China has tended to err towards stricter regulations and control, especially when it comes to a technology with the ability to conceal information from the government.

4. Ultraman

As a member of the post-1980 generation, the Japanese TV series Ultraman 奥特曼 has a special place in my heart. I had stickers of Ultraman in my room, along with Saint Seiya 圣斗士星矢.

However, this week, one of the Ultraman series, Ultraman Tiga was removed from many streaming platforms in China.

A statement from the National Radio and Television Administration supported the platforms’ actions and said they should promote animes that spread desirable virtues and boycott animes with undesirable contents, such as violence. Ultraman was deemed too violent for children.

Unlike celebrity fan culture and online gaming, the Ultraman series was a fond childhood memory for many post-1980, which happens to be the generation of people with young children right now. This means on this issue, the parents are probably less supportive of a ban, as they did not feel Ultraman was a bad influence on them. Online gaming, on the other hand, is a new phenomenon to the post-1980s generation, so they’re less likely to be understanding.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

I’m particularly missing the Suzhou-style mooncake:

Last few weeks we have focused on social issues inside China. This week we switch focus to international developments outside China.

1. AUKUS

Much ado about nothing?

With hastily arranged top-secret meetings on a “major international development” and speculations ranging from aliens to imminent warfare, I felt kind of let down by AUKUS. But perhaps we should not have gotten so excited — while the imminent announcement became a major headline in Australia, it barely made the front page in the US.

Overall, AUKUS is unlikely to significantly change the regional strategic landscape. Australia is already closely aligned with the US. Incremental decisions by the government over the recent years have shown that Australia has already chosen a side in any conflict between the US and China. This merely confirms that.

And for China, it also understands that Australia has chosen. So this is hardly surprising.

Of course, the devil is in the details. But so far, we don’t have many details and all the attention is on the submarine deal. For Australia, it has ended the agreement with France on diesel-powered submarines in favour of an agreement with the US on nuclear-powered submarines, something the previous government under Turnbull explicitly ruled out.

According to Hugh White:

If Australia’s submarines were intended primarily to defend Australia and our closer neighbours, then there is no way we’d consider nuclear propulsion. But the navy decided many years ago that the primary role for our new boats should be to operate off the coast of China in co-operation with the US Navy, and the government has eagerly gone along.

So the decision was made years ago that the defence of Australia is not just about the defence of the “homeland”, but include operating in China’s coastal waters. This is not a stretch since Australia has gone to wars in the Middle East — far away from the homeland.

Someone to balance and blame

Since the AUKUS announcement, many analysts have started looking for a “proximate cause”. Some say that China has only itself to blame, due to its coercion of Australia. However, even if China did not stop buying certain goods from Australia, the national security analysts in Australia who are supportive now are unlikely to change their position.

A common argument for AUKUS is that it is responding to China’s increasing power and restoring the balance of power in the region.

There is no doubt China is increasing its defence spending and is undergoing military modernization. However, as a percentage of GDP, its military spending has been steady at 1.7 per cent for the past ten years, according to SIPRI. Military spending is often expressed as a percentage of GDP (for example, Australia has committed to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence) because we expect that as a country becomes richer, it spends more on defence.

Since power is relative, whenever the second most powerful country becomes more powerful, it necessarily threatens the existing top power. In that sense, it is China that is the “disturber” of the balance of power in the region. But it is a necessary characteristic of a rising power.

So when people say they want a “balance of power” or “responding to China”, what they really mean is restoring to the old power structure where the US is the dominant power — that is, no country in the world should rise and challenge the US.

After all, the US feels necessary to “respond to China”, even though it is currently spending three times as much as China on defence.

As Van Jackson observed on “balance of power”:

Every US national security strategy since Reagan has made reference to the balance of power, and always in a manner that endorses playing balance-of-power geopolitics but that invariably seeks to achieve a favorable imbalance of power.

Wolf warriors with French characteristics

France is understandably upset about the whole thing. Merely three weeks ago (!!), the inaugural Australia-France 2+2 Ministerial Consultations was held, where the ministers from both countries underlined the importance of the Future Submarine program. Australia has been active in encouraging France to do more in the Indo-Pacific. But apparently, Australia and the UK/US were negotiating behind France’s back this whole time!

France deployed its own version of “wolf warrior diplomacy”. It recalled its ambassadors from Australia and the US (China has not recalled its ambassador to Australia despite everything so far). 

The French Foreign Minister called this “a stab in the back” and a betrayal of trust by Australia. To the UK, he reserved the colourful phrase “fifth wheel on the carriage”. The French Minister for European Affairs called it “a form of accepted vassalization”. Some French politicians even called it a “public humiliation”. 

Hell hath no fury like a country scorned. No doubt just like the Chinese wolf warriors, many of these comments has a domestic audience in mind.

But Australian commentators and the Australian government are standing firm in the face of French “coercion” of Australia’s sovereign decision — many are telling France to get over it — ironic if you remember the Australian Prime Minister’s reaction to a single tweet.

Anyway, as I pointed out last week, business is business when it comes to economic and commercial interests, and that includes defence contracts. Do not assume anything can stand between a country and a bucket of money, not even an alliance.

We are happy little spokes

And that’s what makes the term “forever partnership” (by the Australian PM) cringeworthy. How can partnerships be “forever” when the geopolitical landscape is shifting and even interests are changing?

At one point in time, China was the ally and Japan was the enemy. Here is a 1941 Times magazine explaining how to make arbitrary racial distinctions between Chinese and Japanese people.

AUKUS highlighted that Australia is doubling down on Anglosphere cooperation. It is bound even more tightly to the US, at the cost of building broader and deeper relationships with countries in the region. More hub-and-spoke and less multilateralism. 

Australia is again seeking security from Asia, rather than security in Asia. 

To do that, it is even sacrificing its “sovereign capability” — although I would argue that was never a realistic goal to begin with.

AUKUS is not designed for the current challenges faced by Australia. Australia’s biggest difficulty right now with China is in trade and economics, and not security. China is going to continue its “greyzone” activities against countries rather than warfare for the foreseeable future. AUKUS is unlikely to deter China from continuing its economic coercion.

Above all, I’m most concerned about the lack of transparency and public discussion before the deal is sealed. Even though it could have potentially wide-ranging implications, from nuclear policy to industry policy, it was presented to the Australian public as a fait accompli.

2. CPTPP

In the same week, in a strange twist, China has applied to join the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership). China has been signalling its consideration to join this year, including most recently with a submission to Australia’s parliamentary inquiry into expanding membership of the CPTPP.

The precursor to the CPTPP was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was driven by the US. It was originally envisaged as a way to mitigate the economic power of China in the region. The then US Secretary of Defense even called the trade agreement as important as another aircraft carrier. Yet after Trump was elected, the US withdrew from the agreement and the remaining countries had to negotiate a new agreement, the CPTPP.

While Biden has set a renewed focus on alliances, partners, and multilateralism, the US has not signalled its willingness to join the CPTPP. The protectionist sentiment has not shifted in the US under Biden. But ironically, China has applied to join.

We should rightly be sceptical about China’s application. Unlike Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, CPTPP is a “high-quality” and ambitious trade agreement. It deals not just with tariffs, but also behind the border barriers. Yet, China is tightening government control over aspects of the economy rather than liberalising, this would make joining CPTPP difficult.

Despite this, if China can demonstrate that it can reach the ambition of the trade agreement, then countries should support its application. But countries should also ask China about its use of trade for geopolitical purposes as part of the accession process.

3. Sexual assault cases

A Beijing court has dismissed the landmark sexual assault case, which was brought by Xianzi 弦子 (real name Zhou Xiaoxuan) against the famous CCTV host Zhu Jun 朱军, citing insufficient evidence.

According to Xianzi, her legal team met many “unreasonable difficulties”, including denial of requests for evidence collection. The court ruling is certainly a disappointment for Xianzi’s supporters and MeToo activists.

Authorities are clearly worried about the social ramifications of the ruling. According to China Digital Time, censorship instructions have been issued to internet companies to censor reports on the lawsuit.

There are high barriers for victims of sexual assault seeking justice in the court system. Earlier this month, the case against an Alibaba manager was also dropped. The court found that the man had committed “forcible indecency” but that did not constitute a crime.

Many people in China are paying close attention to issues on gender inequality and sexual harassment. The feminist movement is gaining popularity and broad-based support. However, it is still difficult for victims of sexual assault to find justice through the legal system. In addition, the popular support for MeToo and the potential for mobilisation is also perceived as a threat to the patriarchal CCP regime.

4. Electoral interference

Christian Porter was the Attorney-General of Australia, a portfolio with responsibility for Australia’s national security. In March this year, he was moved to another cabinet (senior ministerial) position as he was taking personal legal action against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. This week, it emerged that he accepted anonymous donations via a blind trust to pay for his legal bills. Under pressure, he resigned from the cabinet but remained in parliament.

So what does that have to do with China?

Remember back in 2014 and 2015, Sam Dastyari, a senator who was not a minister,  received payments from Chinese companies to pay his legal and travel bills. While he declared those payments appropriately, it still led to accusations of foreign interference and it led to him resigning from parliament in disgrace. The whole episode set off the Australian government passing the foreign interference legislation. However, interestingly, the payments received by Dastyari would not be illegal under the new legislation anyway.

According to David Speers:

Just days after Dastyari announced his resignation from Parliament, the newly minted Attorney General Christian Porter announced a ban on foreign political donations. He said it would “improve Australia's confidence in the political system and prevent… new ways of soft power and influence through money.”

Now Christian Porter has accepted payments from unknown sources, but it would be easy for him to find out if he wants to. Yet the government appears to not be concerned about foreign interference risks at all — it is not forcing him to resign from parliament or even to disclose donors. Previously, the same government has been very vocal about foreign interference risks, especially in universities.

So it seems that the government is only concerned about foreign interference when it is convenient (such as when it targets the opposition or when it targets the sector it does not like).

Yet most of the national security commentators are also muted on this serious risk to Australia’s democracy and national security, in contrast to the outrage directed at Dastyari previously.

It makes me wonder whether the government and much of the national security community actually take “defending democracy” and “electoral interference” seriously. Or is it only a problem when we can connect it to China?

5. Military diplomacy

According to an upcoming book by reporters Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, the US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Mark Milley reassured his Chinese counterparts about US government intentions. 

US senator Marco Rubio has called Milley’s actions “treasonous leak of classified information”. But the former chair of the joint chiefs of staff Michael Mullen defended Milley’s actions, saying they were not abnormal, “having communications with counterparts around the world is routine”.

It is when tensions are at the highest and the relationships are at the most difficult that we can truly appreciate the value of diplomacy. Now we can comfortably examine whether Milley’s actions were right or not because war is not imminent. Looking back at the nuclear close calls between the USSR and the US, I’m thankful for the efforts of individuals to prevent a nuclear war.

Such diplomatic assurance actually shows the flexibility of US diplomacy. In contrast, as Peter Martin pointed out in his book China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, Chinese diplomats do not enjoy the same flexibility. They often deliver the same message regardless of the intended audience. The outcome of such diplomacy is surely less ideal.

However, if Milley’s concerns are correct, the most worrying aspect of it all is perhaps the potential for spillover of an unstable presidency and the perception by the US’s adversary that a US president could wage a war in order to stay in power.

Neican Brief is supported by the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

China may be de-prioritising education requirements on the English language, but it’s not necessarily a bad thing.

Last month, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission issued a notice on measures to reduce the burden of students and to enhance comprehensive all-round education (素质教育 rather than exam-oriented education 应试教育). 

One of the measures is that students in Years 3-5 can only be tested on (Chinese) Literature and Mathematics in their final exams. For students in years 6-9, they can only be tested on (Chinese) Literature, Mathematics and Foreign Language in both mid-term and final exams (the other subjects can only be tested in the final exams).

The removal of English as a subject for final exams in Years 3-5 have attracted some attention in English-language media.

But we must remember that Foreign Language (English) remains a compulsory subject in primary schools, and one of the compulsory exam subjects in the National College Entrance Exam. So removing English from exams in Years 3-5 will not stop students from studying English anyway.

Yet there appears to be an expectation among English-speaking people and media that students in non-English speaking countries should prioritise studying English. And if the country starts to de-prioritise English in any way, then it’s a sign of regression, of decoupling from the world.

First, this is an alarmist perspective. Students will continue to learn English, simply because it is still examinable later on. But even if it’s not, most of them will continue to learn English, because it is still perceived as useful.

Second, this is an Anglo-centric perspective.

Let’s consider Australia. In NSW, foreign languages are not compulsory beyond Year 8. For the Higher School Certificate exam, the only compulsory subject is English. In fact, Australia is at the bottom of all OECD countries in terms of language study. Yet, there is very little concern that Australia has regressed and decoupled from the world. Most Australian or US leaders have never made a speech in another language, but somehow we should be concerned that Chinese leaders are not doing so in English anymore?

Now learning a second language (such as English or Chinese) is very useful. I highly recommend it to you all. If it was up to me, I would make studying a foreign language compulsory too. But it is a bit hypocritical for people from countries that don’t require foreign language study to be worried that another country is de-prioritising English.

2. Trade and tariffs

The Biden Administration is considering a new investigation into China’s industrial subsidies, according to Bloomberg.

During the Trump Administration, the US was focused on trade issues with China, with the US willing to trade off other issues (such as human rights in Xinjiang) to secure a trade deal. In January 2020, the US and China signed a trade deal, including commitments for China to purchase more US agricultural goods.

Now that China’s industrial subsidies and trade with the US may be back under the spotlight,  here are few things to keep in mind:

1. While the US is unhappy about China’s industrial subsidies, it is also increasingly using active industrial policies, including industrial subsidies.

2. The Biden Administration is continuing with the protectionist trajectory. Although Biden has embraced more multilateral approaches, in trade it is still “America First”.

3. Yet US industries and consumers are also suffering from the tariff — it’s not a cost imposed only on China.

4. The US has not agreed to appoint new members to the WTO Appellate Body. The dispute resolution function of the WTO has fallen apart due to the repeated rejection of new appointments by the US. This means disputes on trade agreements cannot be adjudicated.

The US-China trade dispute has not been good for multilateralism or a “rules-based order”,  with bilateral purchase agreements and tariffs imposed outside WTO mandate.

But it is the small countries, such as Australia, that will suffer/have suffered the most from the erosion of multilateral trading rules. While the two big players have the economic arsenals to fight each other, smaller economies do not. What smaller economies rely on is multilateral institutions such as the WTO.

A friend in need

Saul Eslake from Corinna Economic Advisory produced the following charts on China’s imports:

The US and other Western countries have offered much rhetorical support to Australia as a victim of China’s trade actions. Yet as Australia’s coal, copper, barley and lobster exports are being decimated, they are happily picking up the slack. They’re benefitting from Australia’s loss while egging on Australia to stand firm.

Meanwhile, the United States Studies Centre (which is set up to strengthen the Australia-US relationship) has linked the alliance (security and defence dialogue) with trade.

This idea may actually be a good one if the US could be convinced to sacrifice its own economic and trade interests for other countries such as Australia. Or would Australia’s trade woes be another cost of the alliance, like the wars in the Middle East?

3. Evergrande

Evergrande (恒大集团), once China’s biggest developer, has a huge debt problem. It is facing $300 billion in debt and has started to pay bills with unfinished properties.

Retail investors of the company have gathered at the company office protesting against the company. Stock market-related protests are a common source of protests in urban cities.

Residential real estate is an industry that deeply affects all Chinese people living in cities. China has a high saving rate (partly due to the lack of social net) and much of the wealth is tied up in residential real estate. So real estate is an industry of high significance to social stability.

In recent years, the Chinese Government has focused on the issue of debt, but it remains to be seen whether it will let companies like Evergrande collapse, or whether it would be considered “too big to fail”. Letting companies collapse would send the right signal to the market to not rely on government bailouts. But a residential real estate company has so many stakeholders — both home buyers and investors — that it could affect social stability. So the government is unlikely to let the company suddenly collapse without any form of support.

Evergrande’s troubles may flow onto the residential real estate market in China. The government likely prefers the real estate market to cool gradually without sudden price changes. A cooler housing market will affect China’s imports such as iron ore.

4. China’s YouTube defenders

I don’t use YouTube much except to watch Physics lectures and Chinese dramas. But YouTube is also like the wild west, where everything from disinformation to propaganda can proliferate.

And unsurprisingly, there are many defenders of China’s government actions on YouTube, including those that deny any atrocities are committed in Xinjiang. Some have accused these YouTubers of being paid stooges of the CCP, but that’s not necessarily the case.

First, misinformation and disinformation proliferate on social media; many of these spreading messages are not motivated by pure and direct financial incentives. If people are willing to spread pro-Trump misinformation voluntarily, they may also do the same with pro-CCP misinformation.

Second, even if people are motivated by financial incentives, direct bribery is often unnecessary. As Yuen Yuen Ang points out in her book China’s Gilded Age, other practices such as “revolving door” can function in the same way as bribery. Some people may believe their actions can generate future benefits, including monetary, reputational or access benefits. Such incentives are what drives the military-industrial-think tank-government complex in many countries.

Neican Brief is made possible by the support of the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

The Chinese leadership is deeply conservative on certain social issues. When it comes to gender norms or “family values”, their stance resembles the Christian right in the West.

In the past year, the government has tried to constrain gender expressions and eliminate gender diversity. I have noted previously the renewed push for “traditional family values” and “traditional feminine virtues”, in the context of China’s fertility policy. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education early this year highlighted the “feminisation” of young men as a problem that needs to be solved by cultivating “masculine energy”. These measures aim to pigeonhole individuals into two predetermined gender expressions (that are aligned with their perceived biological sex).

This week, the National Radio and Television Administration published a notice that, among other things, banned “effeminate men” 娘炮 from screens and calling it a “perverse aesthetic” 畸形审美. This is part of a project to instil the “correct aesthetic” that includes acting styles, costumes, and makeup.

According to the notice, the aim is to maintain “cultural confidence” and promote “traditional culture”, “revolutionary culture” and “socialist culture”. Of course, this ignores the fact that in China (as is in most cultures), diversity in gender expressions, just like homosexuality, is often part of the “traditional culture”.

While the Chinese Government is insisting on strict gender norms, the Taiwan Government has taken a different approach. Its Ministry of Culture produced this meme in response to China’s notice:

This message was also promoted by Taiwan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare. And this is a message that I wholeheartedly endorse and support.

Enforcing strict gender norms does enormous harm to LGBT+ people in society, including nonbinary and genderqueer people. But even for young people that are cishet (cisgender and heterosexual), it can foster unhealthy behavioural expectations such as “boys don’t cry”.

This year, there have been some concerning crackdowns on LGBT+ groups. In February, a Chinese court ruled in favour of a publisher that described homosexuality as a mental disorder in a university textbook. The court said the description was not an intellectual error, even though homosexuality has been removed from the list of mental disorders in 2001. In July, WeChat shut down some university student-run accounts. In August, Shanghai University asked for a list of LGBT+ students.

As China becomes more authoritarian, it is attempting to enforce a degree of conformity on individuals by eliminating diversity in culture (Uyghurs), sexuality and gender expressions. This is a tactic also used by right-wing governments around the world. In Russia and Hungary, the rights of LGBT+ people are also on the retreat.

2. Political correctness

While the ban on “effeminate men” has attracted attention, the National Radio and Television Administration notice is far more wide-ranging. The published notice works in tandem with last week’s order from the Cyberspace Affair Commission to tighten regulations on China’s celebrity fan culture.

The notice included measures to “resolutely boycott immoral actors”, who have “incorrect political stances”. It also includes measures to “boycott high pay for shows/films”.

It will become even more difficult for TV/film producers and public figures to avoid politics. Actors and celebrities are not only expected to toe the party line as before, but now the pressure is on for them to actively promote it at every opportunity. Anyone who dares to deviate from the “correct political stance” would suffer severe consequences and be boycotted by government order. When it comes to power between the state and celebrities in China, the state has the absolute upper hand.

Producers must also be more cautious about what sort of films or TV shows they produce and invest in. We should expect more films and TV shows with nationalistic elements, that praises the CCP and promote “positive energy”. More “realism” and military; less fantasy and social critique. So I guess 皓衣行 (Immortality), the upcoming Boy Love Xianxia drama, will never make it.

Celebrities will also need to be on their best behaviour in order to conform to the “moral standards” set by the government. In practice, this means more charity work and less self-indulgence. They must strive to be an upstanding citizen and good role model first and foremost.

The government has taken a paternalistic approach on a number of social issues, from gaming to the entertainment industry. While many people in China believe that the government is acting to curb “vices”, such as gaming addictions and celebrity idol-worshipping, it’s unclear whether they would agree that the government should play an active role. 

But where does it stop? While most people may have applauded the crackdown on party and state officials committing vices, it’s another matter for them to enforce their “morality” on everyone in the country. Again, legislating “morality” is the sort of thing that right-wing governments have done around the world.

Ultimately, such paternalism shows that the CCP does not trust the Chinese people to make their own decisions without the party’s guidance.

3. Gig workers

Didi, which is currently being investigated for data protection violations, is helping its drivers form a union. It’s important to remember workplace unions are not independent but operate under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, a party-controlled body.

Earlier this year, delivery drivers (who like Didi drivers are also gig workers) for companies such as Meituan and Ele.me tried to organise, but their lead organiser was detained by the local police.

There is a familiar pattern in China on labour issues. While the government is criticising companies for their labour practices, it is also trying to stifle grassroots labour movements. Labour movements must be organised under the control and guidance of the government, and never go against party priority.

As Didi is setting up a union, a Hong Kong University PhD student researching labour movements in China was detained in Nanning for “subverting state power”.

The government is worried about anything that can potentially organise and challenge state power, from religions/cults to celebrities, and to labour organisers. To deal with these forces, it uses both co-option and crackdown. In the case of the labour movement, it is cracking down on leaders and co-opting the masses through unions.

While unions have been criticised for their lack of independence, sometimes workers can still use them to pressure management. In any case, the fact that Didi is helping workers to form a union shows that labour issues among gig workers have gained prominence. I just hope that it is more than a superficial change.

Neican Brief is made possible by the support of the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

• October 19: Hong Kong | common prosperity | LinkedIn | WeChat | marriages

• October 11: Chinese language media in Australia | censorship in media | US-China trade | BRI debt | Taiwan flights

• September 28: Hostage exchange | power rations | crypto | Ultraman

• September 21: AUKUS | CPTPP | sexual assault cases | electoral interference | military diplomacy

• September 14: Foreign language | trade and tariffs | Evergrande | YouTube

• September 7: Gender diversity | Enforced morality | Gig workers

• August 31: algorithm | fan circle | Xi Thought in curriculum | online gaming

• August 24: Common prosperity | AfPak | online privacy

• August 17: Celebrity and nationalism | Disaggregating "Chinese influence" | Dissenting intellectuals | Sexual assault

• August 3: Regulations | Visits | Asia-capability in Australia

• July 27: Three Child | Cyber attribution | Competitive purchase | MeToo

• July 13: Polls | LGBTQ accounts | Data regulation | Olympics boycotts

• July 6: Xi's Centenary Speech | Didi and tech | freedom of speech

• June 29: Centennary | HK | Kiwifruit

• June 18: Struggle | G7 | China Initiative | Australia-China survey

• June 13: Anti-sanctions | Gaokao | Education | Industry policy

• June 4: Three Child | Discursive Power | June 4 | Lie Down |Yang

• May 21: census | human rights | conspiracy | propaganda

• May 7: May 4th | War talks | Port of Darwin | New Zelealand

• April 28: Tsinghua | Countering China | Victoria BRI | Wen Jiabao

• April 20: historical nihilism | patriarchy & misogyny | Chinese-Australians in the public service

• April 12: Alibaba fine | Huawei and Ericsson | public opinion on military affairs

• March 31: Sanctions & counter-sanctions | Russia | Iran

• March 22: Anti-Asian racism | US-China (allies), trials of Canadians, formalism & bureaucratism

• March 15: Demography | hukou | Lei Feng | Uyghur genocide

• March 8: Two Sessions | poverty alleviation | Hong Kong (electoral reform) | delivery drivers

• February 26: Party history | Hua Guofeng | rural issues & food security | heroes and martyrs

• February 19: Centenary narrative | Securitisation of research | IP protection, Spring Festival Gala | CCP leadership

• February 12: Taiwan | debt diplomacy | vaccine diplomacy | Young Pioneers | Clubhouse

• February 6: Xinjiang | Chinese Australians | CGTN in UK | CICIR | “feminisation"

• January 27: law in Xi’s China | Australia’s China policy | Science and China connections | economic data | Boys Love and Danmei

• January 19: Strategic vision and Xi’s timescape ( Two Centenary Goals) | US strategy for the Indo-Pacific | Sanctions and anti-sanctions

• January 12: the Capitol | Hong Kong arrests | United Front regulations | Labour rights & 996

• January 5: China-EU investment treaty | Chinese-Australians in the APS | Citizen journalist Zhang Zhan

2020

• December 21: Nanjing Massacre | democratic solidarity | Zoom & censorship | CCP members

• December 14: Politburo meeting | overseas lending | Chinese journalist

• December 6: Zhao tweet | visa restrictions | MeToo | Archaeology

• November 30: social credit system | China studies | perspectives from China

• November 23: 14 grievances | US’ "China Challenge" | Shi Yinhong

• November 16: Hong Kong lawmakers ousted | monopoly regulation | RCEP & EAS | foreign interference

• November 9: US-China relation under Biden | Ant Group IPO | Australia-China trade | foreign interference

• November 1: Fifth Plenum | 14th FYP | disinformation | pro-Trump and anti-CCP alliance

• October 26: Cross-strait relations | Korean War | nationalism online

• October 19: Chinese-Australians | Shenzhen: 40th anniversary | Beijing’s assessment of American power

• October 11: National consciousness | domestic violence | views on China

• October 5: US Presidential Debate | Fifth Plenum | Archaeology

• September 27: Ethnic minorities | Ren Zhiqiang | Global Data Security Initiative | climate change

• September 20: CCP and economy | WeChat and TikTok bans | 'Data leak'

• September 13: Journalists in Australia | Scientists in the US | China-India border dispute | Mulan

• September 6: China's military | minority language education | ideological and political education | China-Europe

• August 30: Internal circulation & self-reliance | science fiction & role of art | subnational relations with China

• August 23: State capitalism | rectification campaign | Guo Wengui | LGBTQ

• August 16: Hong Kong | food wastage | Confucius Institute | justice in China | Taiwan

• August 9: Technology decoupling | Beidaihe summit | Wang Yi’s interview | academic freedom | Shiji

• August 2: TikTok | two eras for US-China relations | Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps | Fifth Plenum | Lee Teng-hui | Hong Kong

• July 26: US-China consulate tit-for-tat | Pompeo speech | researcher indictments | Fulbright

• July 19: TikTok | CCP membership | Mao swim

• July 12: Human rights | TikTok | dynastic cycle | Xu Zhangrun

• July 5: Hong Kong’s national security law | birth control in Xinjiang | teaching history, Australian defense posture | India's app ban

• June 28: Human cost of US-China rivalry | ASIO raid | Lowy poll | Canadian hostages

• June 21: Xi thought | China-India escalation | DNA collection | US-China | cyber attacks

• June 14: China's future-past (Cai Xia) | online content (Zoom & Twitter) | scientists and researchers

• June 7: June 4th, US protests, coordinating democracies, stock exchanges

• May 31: National People’s Congress | US measures (on Hong Kong) | China-India | Chinese students in the US

• May 24: Economic priorities | Hong Kong national security law | US’ strategic approach to China | COVID inquiry

• May 17: Politburo meeting | Australia-China trade | space ambitions | Hong Kong

• May 10: WeChat surveillance | CICIR report on competition | media war | cyber espionage

• May 3: Two sessions | Australia-China diplomatic row | press freedom | military budget & readiness

• April 26: Independent inquiry on COVID | Party historiography | Party/people | nationalist harassment

• April 19: GDP | “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy | letters | Hong Kong

• April 12: Ren Zhiqiang | xenophobia | WHO | human rights panel

• April 5: COVID-19 & racism | US-China cooperation | Cyber sovereignty, Hungary

• March 29: COVID & China’s relations | divergent responses | foreign influence/interference | community of shared future

• March 22: COVID-19 update | expelling journalists | scientists | reclaiming Dr Li

• March 15: COVID-19 propaganda | Xi in Wuhan | censorship and "translations" | new US Xinjiang bill

• March 8: Women in China | gratitude education | US-China media war | Xinjiang and modern slavery | KMT’s cross-strait policies

• March 1: Gui Minhai | China’s billionaires | Sun Yang | arrests of pro-democracy figures in Hong Kong

• February 24: US-China-Europe | WSJ journalists expelled | US designation of Chinese media | more Xinjiang leaks

• February 16: COVID-19 & theatre of state power | Chinese military hacking | CIA spying/Huawei | US leadership

• February 9: death of Dr Li Wenliang | censorship | propaganda

• February 2: Coronavirus | research collaboration | Huawei and 5G | China and international organisations

• January 26: Coronavirus | party-state censorship overseas | ex-Interpol President.

• January 19: Forbidden City scandal | US-China trade deal: phase one | GDP & population | Coronavirus.

• January 12: Taiwan’s election | Beijing on US-Iran tensions | Spring Festival |Indonesia-China in the South China Sea | continuing Wang saga.

• January 5: CCP ideology | medical infection rumours | Twitter public diplomacy

2019

• December 29: “People’s Leader” | forced prison labour | egg freezing | China-South Korea-Japan trilateral relations

• December 22: intellectual freedom | one country, two systems | pork crisis | military modernisation | sports censorship

• December 15: US-China decoupling | trade deal phase one | China’s 2020 economic agenda | book-burning | hostage diplomacy

• December 8: China’s economic policy in 2020 | China-Russia relations | Xinjiang’s human catastrophe | momentum of Hong Kong protests

1. Regulating algorithms

The Cyberspace Administration of China has been busy lately. After its recent work on Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law, it has released a draft regulation for consultation on “algorithm recommendations” 互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定 [China Law Translate]. The draft includes the following provisions:

• Algorithms that make users addicted or spend large amount of money are banned

• Providers must give users the choice to not use algorithmic recommendations (i.e. the right to receive non-personalised recommendations)

• Users must be able to delete keywords used in recommendation services

• Algorithms for unreasonably differentiate prices for consumers are banned

These provisions give more power to individual consumers to opt-out of “personalised” recommendations. Internationally, critics of social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube have focused on the lack of transparency of algorithms used in how these platforms recommend or “personalise” content and the difficulty in opting out. In some cases, YouTube recommendations have pushed users towards neo-Nazi content. 

As a result, many advocates around the world are pushing for the regulation of algorithms. But most jurisdictions are still in the early stages on this. For example, the Filter Bubble Transparency Act was re-introduced to the US Senate in June 2021. So China is an early mover on the regulation of recommending algorithms. This means that China may have more clout in future global governance on this issue.

But the draft regulation has more!

One particular provision deals with protecting workers’ rights. This is targeted at algorithms for ride-hailing and delivery services. Delivery drivers have been the focus of some labour movements this year, so this is likely part of the response to that.

Last, but perhaps most important for the Chinese government, the draft regulation also deals with social stability. One of the provisions requires platforms to present information that aligns with mainstream value ​​in areas such as the homepage, hot searches, and top content. 

The principle behind this provision is that the platforms should “orient towards mainstream values” and “actively transmit positive energy”.

Here “mainstream values” usually refer to values acceptable to the government and “positive energy” usually means removing severe criticisms of government and society. So platforms must use algorithms to achieve a “desirable” social end. 

This requirement is concerning for us who live in liberal democracies. But it is also interesting considering the current critique of the YouTube algorithm. As there is no such thing as a “neutral” algorithm, how to regulate algorithms to ensure they don’t encourage things such as Nazism or spread disinformation is still a challenge for liberal democracies.

An additional provision requires algorithms with the capacity for social mobilisation be assessed by the government. In the past, Facebook (and TikTok) has been used as a tool for social and political mobilisation outside of China, both positive (helping neighbours) and negative (organising white supremacist rallies). It’s not surprising that the Chinese government is worried about the mobilisation potential of the internet.

2. Regulating “fan circles”

Zhao Wei

I never thought I’d write so much about celebrities. Recently, there was Kris Wu and Zhang Zhehan. Now the latest celebrity “erased” online (including works taken down and name removed from credits) is Zhao Wei (赵薇, Vicky Zhao).

Zhao is a generation older than Wu and Zhang — she is famous for her role in the 1998 TV drama My Fair Princess (还珠格格), alongside Fan Bingbing 范冰冰 and Lin Xinru (林心如, Ruby Lin). Nowadays she is also a producer. Incidentally, Zhang Zhehan was signed to her company.

The reason behind her erasure is not yet known, speculations are rife. Rumours range from financial reasons (tax evasion etc.) to being too close to Jack Ma.

Regulating “fan circles”

The recent crackdowns may be related to the government’s efforts to rein in “celebrity worship”. This week, the Cyberspace Affair Commission (the party-equivalent of the Cyberspace Administration) issued a notice on regulating “fan circles” 关于进一步加强“饭圈”乱象治理的通知. This builds on a rectification campaign from mid-June. The notice includes measures such as:

• abolishing celebrity ranking charts

• making celebrity agencies responsible for the behaviour of approved fan groups

• ensuring fan group accounts are authorised by celebrity agencies

• dissolving fan groups that focus on gossips and scandals

• banning certain practices that encourage fans to spend money to support their idols, such as ranking of fans’ purchasing amount

• banning certain reality TV practices, such as “paying to vote”

Now a disclaimer here. I have never been part of the fandom or “celebrity worship” culture — I don’t understand why anyone would buy things just because they’re endorsed by a particular celebrity, or why they would try to ensure “their” celebrity is more popular than other celebrities.

First, celebrities get paid a lot. This is because die-hard fans’ are willing to watch anything their idols are in and buy anything they endorse. And celebrities are certainly not shy from endorsing all kinds of products, including via live-streaming. 

Second, a number of celebrities have also been accused of tax evasion in recent years, including by keeping two sets of books (one for themselves, one for the tax authorities). So celebrity crackdown may also be related to the campaign currently underway to reduce (visible) wealth inequality.

Third, “celebrity worship” culture is perceived as a problem by many people in society, as they lead to “irrational” behaviours. The most famous example is a woman whose obsession with Andy Lau led her father to commit suicide in order to draw Lau’s attention to her. In this instance, most people were sympathetic to Lau and placed blame on the woman.

Last year, the behaviour of Xiao Zhan (star of The Untamed)’s fans led to the “227 incident” where fans of Xiao and supporters of a fanfiction website went to figurative war with each other. This time, many blamed the fan behaviour on Xiao. Xiao later apologised for the incident.

Now the government has put the onus on celebrity agencies to guide fan behaviours. This way, fan movements are less likely to be grassroots movements — they must be supervised by the celebrity agencies. For the regulator, this devolves responsibility and ensures celebrity agencies (and celebrities themselves) will have to act more cautiously. Similar to censorship by platforms, celebrity agencies will need to guess the intention and requirements of government regulators — they will need to think about where the shifting red line is.

But there is one celebrity in China whose fan club is not being constrained. The party-state has put huge amounts of resources into expanding the cult of this idol. I’m sure you know who I’m talking about. 

3. Xi thought in curriculum

A Reader on Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era has officially been introduced into the national curriculum, from the new school year (tomorrow). The Reader will be used for Years 3, 5, 8 and 10. The Reader is just one part of the overall ideological education on Xi Thought in the curriculum.

Ideological education is nothing new in China of course. Efforts to indoctrinate children on ideology and patriotism has redoubled in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre. Ideological education sits in the curriculum as a class, just like maths or science in grade schools, and is also compulsory in higher education.

Ideological education is targeted at different levels of maturity. In primary schools, fostering a love for the country and the party dominates. Children go on field trips and are told stories of sacrifices of revolutionary heroes that made the “New China”. 

As children get older, ideological education becomes more theoretical. High school children would study the guiding ideology of the CCP, which comprises Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, Three Represents (Jiang Zemin), Scientific Outlook on Development (Hu Jintao), and now Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

However, with this change of curriculum, Xi Thought has become a special topic to focus on, elevating it above other parts of the guiding ideology. It harkens back to the Mao era, with the Reader mirroring the Little Red Book.

This change comes at a time that the government is trying to ease pressure on students. In this context, devoting more time to the study of Xi Thought shows the increasing importance of ideology in educating future citizens.

4. Regulating online gaming

The National Press and Publication Administration has issued a notice on preventing online gaming addiction for minors 切实防止未成年人沉迷网络游戏. The notice requires gaming companies to only provide services to minors between 8pm-9pm on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays. That is, minors are only allowed to game for three hours a week at the specified time.

This is not the first time that a gaming time limit has been imposed for minors. In 2019, a similar notice was issued banning gaming companies from providing services to minors after 10pm as well as limiting gaming time to 3 hours on weekends and 1.5 hours on weekdays. Enforcement measures include real-name registration and facial recognition. So this week’s notice merely tightened the limit further.

Just like “celebrity worship”, online gaming is seen (especially by parents of teenagers) as a social ill. In 2018, gaming addiction was included as a disease by the World Health Organization. There are clinics that specifically treat gaming addiction, akin to drug rehabilitation clinics. Many parents are likely supportive of measures that curb online gaming, even though they seem rather draconian.

The interesting question is what will the youths spend their time doing, since they are going to spend less time doing homework or gaming or following celebrities.

5. Labour law ruling

The Supreme People’s Court released some cases on labour law. One of the cases directly refers to the 996 system popular with tech companies. The 996 system is where employees work from 9am to 9pm for six days a week.

The ruling said the 996 system violated labour law. Under the Labour Law, overtime should not exceed 1 hour a day under normal circumstances, not exceed 3 hours a day under special circumstances, and not exceed 36 hours in a month.

The problem is 996 has always violated labour law, and everyone knows it violated labour law, yet the government has chosen to turn a blind eye to it, even as companies openly praise the practice.

But it appears change might be in the air. I’m cautiously optimistic that the government might start to enforce labour laws more strictly, and companies may change their practices as backlashes grow. But for activists that have for years called on the government to enforce its own laws, they may be a bit more sceptical and cynical.

Neican Brief is made possible by the support of the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

As readers know, the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, China’s highest economic decision-making body, held a meeting to discuss “common prosperity” 共同富裕 (the Chinese term is also the literal translation of “common-wealth”, but Commonwealth means something quite different from common-wealth nowadays).

You can find Adam’s take on the topic and his translation of the readout.

Even though China is ostensibly a “socialist” country working towards “Communism”, inequality in China is worse than in many “capitalist” countries, especially when compared to social democratic countries such as Norway or Finland.

Deng’s motto “let some people/regions get rich first” 让一部分人、一部分地区先富起来 was followed by “lead and help others to achieve common prosperity” 带动和帮助其他地区、其他的人，逐步达到共同富裕. This sounds like “trickle-down economics” as practised in the US. 

Under this idea, some people got extravagantly rich. While the poor also got richer (China proclaimed the elimination of absolute poverty), the disparity between rich and poor has grown. But more than that, some poor people now believe the game is stacked against them, and have become nostalgic for the “real Communism” before Deng.

Yuen Yuen Ang, a professor of China’s political economy, calls China since Deng “China’s Gilded Age”. I agree with her comparison:

The Gilded Age, which began in the 1870s, was an era of crony capitalism as well as extraordinary growth and transformation. Following the devastation of the Civil War, the United States rebuilt and boomed. Millions of farmers moved from fields to factories, infrastructure opened up long-distance commerce, new technology spawned new industries, and unregulated capital flowed freely. In the process, swashbuckling entrepreneurs who seized on the right opportunities at the right time—Stanford, J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller—amassed titanic levels of wealth, while a new working class earned only a pittance in wages. Politicians colluded with tycoons, and speculators manipulated markets.

It is also an image reminiscent of Dickensian England (the same time that Marx was in England), and precisely the sort of image portrayed by the CCP until the 70s of what capitalist societies are like.

Highly visible hyper-inequality is generally detrimental to regime stability, or even economic growth. Now that the cake in China has gotten bigger, perhaps it is time to think about how to divide it. And since “trickle-down economics” does not work, the government needs to play a crucial role in redistribution.

Marxists predicted that the Communist revolution would only occur after industrialisation, yet the Chinese Communist Party took power when China was still largely agrarian. Now that China has become an industrial power, the government, like other capitalist governments, should start to implement more progressive policies to stave off a potential revolution.

However, there is a difference with China compared to other “capitalist” countries — China is not a democracy. It remains to be seen whether the CCP can pull off this feat using top-down tactics without significant unintended consequences. As power and wealth are so intertwined, is it possible to have such a high degree of concentration of power with dispersion of wealth?

2. Stability and security in AfPak

A suicide attack targeting a vehicle carrying Chinese nationals occurred near Gwadar Port. The Gwadar Port is the flagship project of China’s BRI in Pakistan. And Pakistan is probably China’s closest partner right now — an “all-weather friend” and an “iron brother”.

China’s BRI projects operate in some unstable regions of the world. But that’s not to say Chinese companies prefer instability. Most of China’s investment still flows to more stable countries such as the United States and European countries. Western companies, especially resource companies, also operate in many unstable regions. Companies of course prefer stable governments, and generally require a higher rate of return for projects in riskier areas. 

The Chinese Government no doubt also prefers to deal with stable governments, whether authoritarian or democratic. This is why China is willing to work with the Taliban in Afghanistan, even though the group killed 11 Chinese workers in 2004. As long as the Taliban can bring some stability to the region, it is positive for China’s interests. Similarly, China was willing to work with the military junta in Myanmar, even though it actually preferred the democratically-elected NLD.

Private companies operating in unstable regions generally rely on private security, including private military companies (such as the notorious Blackwater). With the growth of BRI in unstable regions, China’s private security industry is also expanding.

However, in China’s case, the line between private and the state can be easily blurred. This is demonstrated by the case of Huawei. And with expanding Chinese interests, including business interests and even tourists, in Central Asia and the Middle East, there will be strong popular pressure for the Chinese Government to do more to protect these interests. After all, the Chinese Government has raised this expectation itself, with films like Wolf Warrior and Operation Red Sea.

3. Personal information protection

Following the Data Security Law, the National People’s Congress recently adopted the Personal Information Protect Law [China Law Translate, DigiChina]. The law deals with the collection and processing of personal information by private companies, similar to Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation.

This is a significant step forward for online privacy in China. Contrary to popular perceptions, people in China do care about privacy. But like consumers everywhere, it’s always about the trade-off, for example between privacy and convenience, and these days, between privacy and public health.

Note that the law mostly regulates the exchange of information between individuals and companies, not between the state and individuals (although there is a section on the processing of personal information by state organs, “legally prescribed duties” can be very broad). The Data Security Law, on the other hand, has more potential national security implications. Of course, if there was a conflict between national security and privacy, we expect national security to always prevail — this is not limited to China.

Adam’s Corner

Hey everyone, two items from me this week. First, I translated the new joint decision by the Central Commitee and the State Council on fertility policy. China’s population fertility level has been alarmingly low for some time, and Beijing wants to change that. By making childbearing and childrearing less burdensome and costly, it hopes people will become more inclined to have (more) kids. I’m not sure if the added incentives from government policy will be enough to counteract the trends that have been pushing fertility lower, including new social norms, gender roles and relations, and patterns of personal preferences.

Second, I translated the official readout of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting last Tuesday (August 17), which focused on the idea of “common prosperity”. This is actually really important. Essentially, this is about trying to redistributing the cake now that the cake is much bigger than before. If you are interested in how the Chinese leadership perceives the nexus between inequality, economic development, income (re)distribution, and financial risks, then do read my introduction and translation.

Forecast says that there will be more rain in the next few days here in Saxony than an average summer! I think I will stay indoors and drink the pork bone soup I’ve been simmering for the last day or so. Hope it’s sunny wherever you are (unless you are experiencing drought, of course)!

Neican Brief is made possible by the support of the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

Every now and then I turn my attention to celebrity news/gossip — sometimes they can be illuminating about popular trends, government attention, and the interaction between the two.

After the Kris Wu sexual assault allegations, the next celebrity to experience huge controversy is Zhang Zhehan 张哲瀚. Zhang became popular after starring in the recent Boy Love-adapted drama Word of Honor (山河令, available on YouTube and Netflix). Just before this controversy, his star power was ascending, reaching near the top of mainland male star ranking.

However, that quickly changed with allegations that he has a close affinity with Japan. The controversy started with photos of him attending a friend’s wedding at a Japanese shrine last year and him visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. His frequent visits to Japan was also seen as evidence online that he is “close to Japan”, or more extremely, that he’s a Japanese spy.

All of these happened right around the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II (15 August) and the Japanese Defence Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine — so anti-Japanese and nationalistic sentiments are particularly high in China. At the same time, the Chinese Government is also actively discouraging celebrity worship. This is the perfect timing to make an example out of someone.

As a result of this controversy, many sponsors have ended contracts with him, and there are fears that dramas starring him currently in post-production may never be released. After all, the demographics of fans overlap with the demographic of “Little Pink” — young women. Zhang’s apologies did not seem to quell public anger so far.

In the eyes of Chinese nationalists online, visiting the Yasukuni Shrine is worthy of condemnation and boycotts, due to its high symbolic value. And once a celebrity has lost their halo, even seemingly innocuous actions, such as visiting Japan frequently, is interpreted as further evidence of villainy.

This episode is also notable for the fact that People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the CCP, has weighed in. Its Weibo account criticised the actor. This can be seen as an “official verdict” and a signal for attacks and boycotts to continue.

In most nationalism examples, it is difficult to separate out the role played by the state in instigating or inflaming nationalism and the role played by the masses. They often reinforce each other, but other times, they can work against each other. In this case, the state played a role in drumming up nationalism around the anniversary as well as issuing a statement on the incident.

Nationalistic criticisms and boycotts targeting celebrities is hardly unique to China. In the early 2000s, the Dixie Chicks were criticised and blacklisted for their anti-war stance. After 9/11, many actors also made videos describing how much they love American flags — videos that would fit right in with nationalist propaganda in China. But such nationalism seems cringe-worthy now, so it appears that nationalism has better staying power in China, possibly due to stronger official support.

2. Disaggregating “Chinese influence”

Andrew Chubb wrote an insightful paper PRC Overseas Political Activities: Risk, Reaction and the Case of Australia. He argues that:

Responding effectively to the challenges presented by the PRC’s overseas political activities starts with disaggregating the distinct risks they pose. 

In the conclusion, he drew an interesting parallel:

Titled Silent Contest (较量无声), the film depicted a vast conspiracy among Western governments, civil society and citizens coordinating consciously or unconsciously (the distinction was irrelevant) to infiltrate and subvert China’s rise under the CCP. A similar mode of thinking has, ironically, also gained ground within policy discussions on the PRC’s overseas political activities in liberal democracies. The parallels between Silent Contest and the influential Australian polemic Silent Invasion run deep, and are far from a lone example.

Chubb disaggregated risks posed by the PRC’s overseas political activities into three categories: national security, civil liberties, and academic freedom. The national security risks include electoral interference and elite co-optation. Other risks such as extra-territorial suppression of dissent, Chinese language media platforms, and co-optation of community organisations came under the civil liberties risks category. 

Treating all risks posed by PRC as one overarching national security risk, as Australia has done, has not only diminished civil liberties in Australia but also left some of the most impactful PRC activities unaddressed. This is what I found the most interesting from Chubb’s paper.

For example, the Espionage and Foreign Interference Act only criminalised foreign interference against Australian citizens, “leaving a significant loophole for authoritarian regimes and their supporters to continue coercing overseas students and recent migrants”.

At the same time, the Act introduced a crime of ‘dealing with’ classified information, including hearing classified information, and it does not require such information to be shared with any foreign country.

These are just two of the many criticisms raised by law experts and human rights researchers on the legislation. To me, it seems that the foreign interference legislation is more concerned about protecting the state (and the government) rather than individuals. Indeed Chubb observes that “countering foreign interference against civil liberties is a relatively low priority compared with the national security aspects of foreign interference”.

The paper is comprehensive and details many other issues that readers of Neican would be familiar with, such as freedom of speech in universities, and rising racism and suspicions. I highly recommend the readers to check out the paper in full — it’s very readable. If you have access issues, please DM the author.

3. Dissenting intellectuals

Despite increasing authoritarianism under Xi in China, there are still some courageous dissenting voices. One of them is Xu Zhangrun 許章潤. Xu has been persecuted for his views. Although he is not in jail, he has been fired from his job at Tsinghua, forced to live off his savings and is under surveillance. Yet he has continued to write, and Geremie Barmé has translated his works at China Heritage.

How the CCP treats Xu stands in contrast to how the CCP has lionised some early dissenting intellectuals. The most prominent example being Lu Xun 魯迅. When I lived in Shanghai, I lived near Lu Xun Park and my primary school had a portrait of Lu Xun.

Lu Xun was a dissenting intellectual — he was harshly critical of Chinese society at the time and also of the ruling Nationalist Government. So naturally, the CCP promoted him and his works after the PRC was established (he had died by then — dead people are always easier to appropriate). But would the CCP welcome a dissenting figure like Lu Xun? Of course not, many intellectuals were purged or killed, from the Yan’an Rectification Campaign in the 40s to the Cultural Revolution in the 70s.

Supporting dissent as a revolutionary party is different from supporting dissent as a ruling party. Many parties support intellectual freedom when they’re not in power, but their interests change as soon as they get in power. This happens even in democracies, but there are more constraints on cracking down on dissent in these countries.

The flip side of this are people who always support those in power. There are many who support increasing state power in order to counter external threats (such as those posed by the CCP). Sometimes they are willing to overlook effects on civil liberties. I often wonder what would happen if these anti-CCP crusaders grew up and lived in China instead. Would they give the same advice to the CCP?

4. Sexual assault — Alibaba and Kris Wu

A female Alibaba employee alleged that she was raped by her manager on a work trip. She reported the incident to the company but was mostly ignored until she posted on social media. After her post has gone viral, both the company and the local police finally took notice, with Alibaba pledging to do more to prevent sexual assault.

The technology industry is a male-dominated industry and has known problems with misogyny. Unfortunately for victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault, it often requires going public for the company to take action. It was the same with the Australian Parliament this year. Brittany Higgins also had to make public accusations. Before that, the parliamentarians were more interested in covering it up. Yet, by going public, the victims of sexual assault had to deal with intense publicity.

The Alibaba allegations came right after the Kris Wu allegation. Kris Wu was arrested in Beijing on suspicion of rape. Wu is a Canadian citizen, so this is a consular case for the Canadian embassy. However, unlike the cases of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, who was sentenced to 11 years, the case of Wu is unlikely related to the bilateral relationship between Canada and China.

The Chinese Government, pushed by feminist activists, appears to be taking sexual assault more seriously now. Although the government is trying to take credit for the small progress, it could not have happened without the work of feminists in China.

Neican Brief is made possible by the support of the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

The Chinese Government has been cracking down on a few different technology-related industries recently. We’ve noted previously Ant Financial, Didi, and the online tutoring industry. And now, it is “targeting” food delivery companies by forcing them to focus more on labour rights. We know that the CCP likes to take credit for cracking down on companies that violate labour laws while at the same time penalising workers who organise among themselves.

Many have questioned the motives of this crackdown on technology industries. Is it purely political? Is it because Big Tech is threatening the “monopoly” power of the CCP?

On one level, all regulations are inherently political. Antitrust laws and monopoly regulations are about disciplining and regulating big businesses. As companies become bigger and more powerful, they have more influence over society as well as the behaviour and decision-making of individuals. And that can come at the expense of the influence of governments.

Until recently, the power of big companies appeared to be on the rise, with multinational companies choosing to locate their production where there are minimal regulations, and different jurisdictions competing for the big companies to locate there. Deregulation was in vogue.

But in the last decade, the power of the state has struck back, with neoliberal orthodoxy seemingly on the retreat. People look to governments to do more to regulate companies and protect them from labour abuses or environmental damages wrought by the companies. And industry policies are now commonly accepted.

For tech industries in particular, due to how fast it has grown and how pervasive it has become in everyone’s lives, government regulations have often not kept up to its spread and its importance. While this is great for innovation, people are also becoming concerned about the social costs.

So it is in this context that the Chinese Government is regulating or cracking down on its tech companies. According to Alan Song, “Chinese entrepreneurs and investors must understand that the age of reckless capital expansion is over. A new era that prioritises fairness over efficiency has begun.”

But it may also be more than just regulation, and the timing of the decisions around Ant and Didi seems to suggest that. The CCP (like governments almost anywhere) wants to harness the power of the big tech companies (and the data they hold) for its own purposes. And it wants to ensure the power of the private sector never encroaches on the power of the state. Compared to most democracies, it has more tools at its disposal to ensure that.

So now China is seriously regulating its tech industry, will the US do more in this regard too? After all, one of the arguments put up by the US companies for resisting regulation is that regulation will constrain their growth and they will be less competitive than Chinese companies who are supported by the CCP.

2. Leader visits

Neil Thomas’s recent work compared world leaders visiting China to visiting the US. He found that:

In 2019, the year before Covid-19 halted most travel, 79 foreign leaders visited China, while only 27 called on the United States. More world leaders have visited China than the United States in every year since 2013, a sharp turnaround from the American dominance of the early post-Cold War era.

On regional breakdowns:

In the 2010s, compared to the United States, China received more than triple the number of visits by Asian and Oceanian leaders, more than double the number by African leaders, and almost double the number by Eastern European leaders. Even leaders from North and South America, the US’s diplomatic backyard, slightly preferred China. Only Middle Eastern and Western European leaders made more trips to the United States.

Do read his entire article, which also includes interesting graphs and tables, such as this one:

As you can see, he sourced data from the US Department of State, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and People’s Daily. It shows what interesting research we can do just from using such accessible data.

Even in the age of online multilateral meetings, leader visits are still important. “Guests of Government” visits require the coordination of multiple federal departments and ministers. They are usually an impetus for bureaucrats and ministers to come up with initiatives (or “announceables”) aimed at fostering cooperation between the two countries. Without such push, governments tend to revert to business as usual of managing relationships.

These visits must be planned and agreed upon in advance by both countries. The smaller number of visits to the US is unlikely reflective of demand — most world leaders would like to visit the US, which remains the most powerful country. Rather, I think it’s more reflective of supply — protocol dictates that leaders must meet their counterpart, the President, and the US President may prefer to spend more time focusing on domestic affairs, for example (or in Trump’s, perhaps golf?).

It makes sense for the Chinese Government to focus on diplomacy. China cannot compete with the US on military power (e.g. foreign bases and deployments) or in soft power. And it understands that in multilateral forums such as the UN, having more friends, no matter how small they are, is important.

3. Asia capability in Australia

Australia is investing less in Asia-capability just as Asia has become more important to Australia and the world. One crucial part of investing in future Asia-capability is spending on schools and higher education in Asia-relevant fields, especially the study of Asia’s history, language, and culture.

In the Lowy Institute report on Chinese-Australians in the Australian Public Service (APS), published in April this year, I wrote:

Last decade, Australia spent the least amount of time of all OECD countries teaching a second language to its students. The proportion of students studying a foreign language in Year 12 decreased from 40 per cent in 1960 to around 10 per cent in 2016. The situation with Chinese language study is not much better, with students eschewing Chinese as a second language at Year 12 and university level in Australia.

In response to a survey by Asian Studies Association of Australia, one academic noted: “We have seen the gradual hollowing out of the deep language and cultural expertise on China in Australia. Increasingly those Australians who speak to us about China don’t know the language, nor have they spent extended time studying its history, culture and politics.”

I also noted that language skills are important but insufficient:

It is not enough to rely on translations of official documents or the words of a spokesperson from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reading these is a good and important start, but a greater understanding of China generally — from its customs to its statecraft — is necessary to interpret them. Without those additional layers of understanding and interpretation, the risk of misunderstanding is high.

With understanding Asia so important for Australia, it seems strange that Asian studies programs are being decimated in some Australian universities. For example, the University of Western Australia is moving the Asian studies program to teaching only (no research), after cutting its Indonesian language program. La Trobe has cut Indonesian and Hindi (leaving ANU the only university teaching Hindi in Australia), as well as downsizing its Asia research and engagement program. I feel lucky that ANU has continued to support classes with small enrolment, including in Literary Chinese, which I have been studying for the past year.

The attitude to “regional studies” also partly reflects Western-centric thinking. Some in international relations or strategic studies assume that theories developed in the West can be easily applied to other countries or cultures. Therefore, we don’t need to understand other countries or their languages and cultures — people with expertise in national security but little knowledge of China are frequently asked to comment on China’s policies, intentions and even cultures.

What does it mean for Australia’s future? Even though we like to remind other countries (especially the US and European countries) that we are in the region, culturally we are resistant to this. Due to the lack of investment in training future Asia-capable workforce, Australia may have to rely even more on Asian Australian migrants for their Asia capabilities. 

But barriers and challenges remain (detailed in my Lowy report), as many Australian organisations (including the public service) still have monocultural and monolingual biases. Prof Louise Edwards noted this phenomenon of under-valuing linguistic and cultural knowledge:

they don’t have a multilingual consciousness. By the latter I mean that it is possible for people to only have one language, but to have some understanding of how this limits them, how to appreciate the language labour others are undertaking in communicating with them in their one language, and even how to work effectively with interpreters. Many of our leaders have neither multilingualism or multilingual consciousness—hence the slashing and burning of foreign language and culture courses in universities in recent decades on the basis that they are “too expensive”. [...]

Well, my students are not thrilled about this. They are creative, multilingual, innovative, energetic, empathetic, globally aware and unless they get invited into the heart of organisational policymaking, agenda setting, and listened to while they are there, I fear that they will take their great ideas and head out of Australia, to Asia, where they will be heard. Their cross-cultural skills will be valued rather than ignored, or regarded with suspicion.

Neican Brief is made possible by the support of the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

As expected when the Three Child Policy was announced, the Chinese Government has now followed up the ease of restriction with some carrots to incentivise child-rearing.

In the announcement, this pro-birth policy has been infused with a sense of nationalism, characterised as “a major issue concerning the development of the Chinese nation” 关系中华民族发展的大事情. Appealing to nationalism was also used when restricting births decades earlier.

The announcement listed four reasons for implementing the Three Child Policy. One of the reasons — economic — is also used in countries like Australia for supporting a high immigration level. The announcement explains that the Three Child Policy is:

conducive to maintaining China’s human resource endowment advantages and for responding to a world undergoing great transformations unseen in a century. Population is critical to social development as well as a key variable affecting sustainable economic development. 

有利于保持人力资源禀赋优势，应对世界百年未有之大变局。人口是社会发展的主体，也是影响经济可持续发展的关键变量。

Measures mentioned in this announcement included cancelling “social maintenance fee” 取消社会抚养费, which is the fine levied on people who have extra children, and de-linking schooling and employment from birth status. In the One Child era, having more children means a hefty fine, which can be onerous for an average worker, while rich people can just flout the One Child Policy. In addition, those who have extra children can also be fired from their jobs if they work in a state-owned enterprise.

The new measures aim to reduce the disadvantages of women having children. This includes “strictly” implementing maternity leave 严格落实产假 and providing training for women whose careers were disrupted due to childbirth. Currently, women of childbearing age face discrimination in recruitment. It remains to be seen whether concrete changes will end this practice.

On tax and housing, the Government announced that it will investigate and promote tax-deductibility of child care expenses, as well as give preferential treatment to families with children when allocating public housing. It is also asking local governments to investigate preferential policies in housing purchase for families with children 购买房屋的优惠政策. As real estate is important in family decision-making, with an expectation that parents save up to buy their sons (and now daughters too) a property, whether this preferential policy would have an effect on their decision to have children would be interesting.

Many people in China are reluctant to have more children despite the ease of restriction. Partly this is due to cultural shifts associated with the One Child Policy, but also the cost of having children has skyrocketed. The cost is related to the hyper-competitive nature of the labour market, and by extension, education.

We’ve mentioned last week that the Government is looking to ease pressure on students, which if successful, would alleviate the pressure and cost of having children. The newly introduced measures also aim to reduce the cost of education by promoting more even development in education to solve the problem of “school choice fever” “择校热”难题.

However, I’m not convinced that the focus on education would reduce pressure. For most people, education is a means to an end, which is employment. So unless the labour market becomes less competitive, I don’t think the pressure on education will ease.

2. Cyber

The US, the EU, NATO, along with Canada, the UK, Japan, Australia and NZ have jointly condemned China for its cyber activities, including the hacking of Microsoft Exchange servers.

In the past few years, while countries often hinted that China was behind some cyberattacks, they often did not formally attribute. One of the reasons is that while such attribution damages diplomatic relationships, it usually does not deter future attacks, so the cost/benefit balance was not worth it. The attacking country would always deny that they’re responsible, and concrete evidence for attribution can never be publicly released.

All countries with offensive cyber capabilities engage in cyber intrusion and espionage. Australian Signals Directorate’s motto is “Reveal their secrets. Protect our own.” IISS has assessed that the US is the only tier-one cyber power:

Dominance in cyberspace has been a strategic goal of the United States since the mid-1990s. It is the only country with a heavy global footprint in both civil and military uses of cyberspace, although it now perceives itself as seriously threatened by China and Russia in that domain.

But perhaps China’s hacking of Microsoft is different in nature to US cyber espionage activities. For example, it affects more than just foreign governments, but also many private organisations and individuals, and it is targeted at Microsoft rather than a government agency.

As we’re moving to a realm where commercial and economic interests are more closely intertwined with national interest, and indeed, national security, the divide between commercial and national interests in international norms has become more blurry. This means new norms might be necessary.

In the same month, Amnesty International revealed that Israeli company NSO Group has been helping numerous governments (including possibly India, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia) in their surveillance and monitoring efforts against politicians, journalists, and activists. It will be interesting to see international reactions around that.

3. Spending to compete

Australian taxpayers may end up funding the purchase of Digicel Pacific, a telecommunications company servicing the Pacific and owned by an Irish billionaire. The reason behind the taxpayer funding is all about China — concerns that China might buy it. 

Joe Hockey, Australia’s former Treasurer and Ambassador to the US and now working as a consultant for Digicel, apparently said he has a “patriotic interest” to prevent China from buying Digicel’s assets. Just how much he is getting paid for his “patriotic interest” is anyone’s guess.

But according to AFR:

However, the governments are uncertain how much legitimate interest China has in acquiring Digicel and if its Irish billionaire owner Denis O’Brien could be exaggerating China’s interest to create bidding tension and maximise a sale price.

A former adviser to former Australian foreign affairs minister, Philip Citowicki, said there was “very little evidence” China Mobile was seriously interested in the carrier.

Concerns around China’s geopolitical ambitions have created some perverse incentives here. Private companies operating in the Pacific have an incentive to hype up the China angle in order to get a higher price for the assets they are selling. And it may not be easy for governments such as Australia to know how real or legitimate China’s interests are. In any case, should the Australian Government buy up assets simply because China is interested?

As the G7 is set to increase their infrastructure spending to compete with China, we should expect asset prices to go up, which could mean lower returns for buyers but higher profit for sellers. But we need to acknowledge the different incentives at play and be careful to disentangle private interests from national interests.

4. MeToo

Before the flood tragedies in Henan, the biggest trending topic on social media this week was sexual assault allegations around Kris Wu 吴亦凡. Wu is a Chinese Canadian singer and actor whose career is mostly based in South Korea and China.

The explosive allegations were posted by Du Meizhu 都美竹, also one of the alleged victims. The accusations involved three issues:

1. Wu allegedly used his star power to entice girls by promising them a career in the industry;

2. Some of the victims were allegedly underage; and

3. Wu allegedly raped the victims.

Wu has denied all the allegations. But general public opinion appears to have turned against him. Sponsors have also dropped Wu while the investigation is ongoing.

I hope this will encourage more victims to come forward. However, Du is paying a personal price for going public. Like many women before her, going public with a sexual harassment allegation often result in reputational damage for the victim as well, sometimes even more so than for the perpetrator.

Some of the nationalist voices online have also used this opportunity to accuse Wu, a Chinese Canadian, of “using” Chinese women. As many sportspeople have found out, when you’re successful, many countries compete to claim you, but when you’re disgraced, you’re cast out as a foreigner.

Neican Brief is made possible by the support of the Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.

Opinion polls about China in Australia have proliferated. First, there is the Lowy Poll, which has been running since 2005. As China becomes more important, more questions are asked on the topic.

Just in the last month, there are also the ACRI/BIDA poll and SMH/Age/Resolve Strategic Poll. These two polls ask a broad range of questions on Australia-China relationships. There is also a more niche poll conducted by the Australia Institute on “Should Australia go to war with China in defence of Taiwan?”

The results of Lowy, ACRI, or SMH/Age polls were unsurprising. But I was surprised by the Australia Institute poll, which found that “A similar number of Australians think China will launch an armed attack on Australia (42%) as on Taiwan (49%)”.

This is astounding… How can Australians believe that the chance of China attacking Australia is on par with China attacking Taiwan?

Interpretations and Cautions

How polls are interpreted and their policy implications usually depend on your pre-existing views. With regards to China, there are two common interpretations. One, the government is responding/acting on valid community anxiety or concerns about China. Two, the government has successfully drummed up anxiety and concerns about China in the community.

In any case, it’s worth remembering that the war in Iraq was never popular in Australia and more actions for climate change is popular in Australia. So the Government often does not implement policies based on public opinions.

Murray Goot wrote an extensive critique of the SMH/Age poll, with a section on China. The critique can be applied to other polls about China. First, Goot observed that large numbers of respondents would have had little or no basis on which to answer. Second, and more interestingly, he believes that the “question format lends itself to acquiescence”. 

Having been told that these were all actions that “Australia” had taken — “Australia” being a cue, for most respondents, likely to carry a high positive affect — and knowing little or nothing about the substance of the actions, a substantial number of respondents are likely to have gone down the list, ticking “strongly support” or “support,” one after the other.

Role of race

We must also be mindful of how race and racism shape public opinions. Medenica and Ebner found that for the US:

White Americans who hold racist beliefs are significantly more likely to endorse aggressive military interventions over diplomacy or economic strategies in foreign countries at odds with the United States, if the residents of those countries are perceived as nonwhite.

This is particularly true when it comes to China.

On racism in Australia, 82% of people believed “foreign buyers from China” were “driving up Australian housing prices”, even though foreign property investment has fallen to record lows. What’s the chance that some of these people see East Asians at an auction and immediately think “foreign buyers from China”?

2. LGBT WeChat accounts

Seemingly out of nowhere, WeChat shut down many university students-run LGBTQ accounts last week. Vague violations of regulations were given as an explanation by WeChat. Whether the latest crackdown is directed by the Government is still unclear, although it’s quite likely.

As we have noted previously, the Chinese Government has intensified the promotion of “traditional family values” and gender norms. Just a few months ago, Weibo and Douban censored feminist accounts. Feminists and LGBTQ activists are generally opposed to strict adherence to gender norms.

While the younger generation has become more accepting of different gender expressions and sexuality, China’s legal system and regulations are still socially conservative. Contents depicting same-sex relationships are banned in mass entertainment (so all the Danmei/Boy Love dramas are depicted as “brotherly love”).

Online, ultra-nationalists have accused LGBTQ activists of “colluding with foreign forces”. Unfortunately, the idea that homosexuality is imported from the West is a common misconception. But it ignores the long recorded history of same-sex love (at least among men) in China (cut sleeve and bitten peaches). On the contrary, it can be argued that homophobia was “imported” along with other Western ideas in the late 19th Century.

As many people (old and young) find information and support online, shutting down these accounts will have detrimental effects on the health and wellbeing of many people in China.

It is a sad state of affairs that the Chinese Government and companies are actively cracking down on feminists and LGBTQ activists while letting ultra-nationalists spread misinformation and harass others freely on the Internet.

3. Data regulation

The Cyberspace Administration of China has released new rules on data security for consultation. The proposed regulation requires companies holding data on more than 1 million users to seek approval before listing overseas.

The proposal lists seven factors that the Cyberspace Administration would consider when granting approval. Among them include:

• Risks of supply disruptions due to political, diplomatic, and trade factors.

• Risks of theft, leaking, destruction and illegal use and export of core data, important data or large volume of personal data.

• Risks of critical infrastructure, core data, important data or large volume of personal data being influenced, controlled, or maliciously used by foreign governments.

Countries around the world are paying much more attention to data security. The national security concerns usually centre on how other countries can access the big data or personal data of domestic residents and use it for malicious purposes. 

The Chinese Government’s data security requirements appear similar to practices in many other jurisdictions. The US Government is also doing work on protecting US data, particularly from “jurisdiction of a foreign adversary, including the People’s Republic of China”.

To ensure data security, many countries, including the EU, are considering data localisation requirements for different types of data. Even when I was working in Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board around four years ago, we were already imposing data localisation conditions.

However, there is a trade-off with data localisation, particularly for small countries. With data localisation, big countries still have a large volume of data they can work with and develop algorithms and services based on big data. Smaller countries do not have the same privilege.

4. Winter Olympics boycott

The European Parliament has called for a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, due to “human rights situation in Hong Kong, the Xinjiang Uyghur Region, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and elsewhere in China”. This is a part of a broader (and non-binding) resolution on Hong Kong. However, before the resolution, the Prime Minister of Greece has already accepted an invitation to attend the Olympics.

There are also pushes for boycotts in other (mostly western) countries, including the US, the UK, Canada and Australia.

I’m not a big sports fan, but separating politics from sports is not easy. International sports is inherently political, starting with which jurisdictions can send participants and who can represent which country.

In any case, a diplomatic boycott is not the same as a sporting boycott. Athletes can still compete even with a diplomatic boycott.

Therefore, if you have any concerns and complaints (or praises), you can now direct them all to me. I apologise in advance for the drop in quality!

1. Centenary speech

For the CCP centenary, here at Neican, we have previously discussed the CCP history and legacy. If you would like more, read Linda Jaivin’s article on the origin story or listen to David Goodman and yours truly in discussion with Mark Kenny.

Today we will focus on Xi’s speech at the celebration ceremony.

This public speech is full of rhetoric intended to drum up nationalism and pride, as you would expect from a public speech from any politician on a similar occasion. It is mostly boilerplate and contains no surprises.

Overview

First up, Xi announced the realisation of “building a moderately prosperous society in all respects” 全面建成了小康社会 and the elimination of absolute poverty 绝对贫困问题. The next step is to achieve the second centenary goal: building China into a strong and modern socialist country in all respects 全面建成社会主义现代化强国.

Then Xi recited the well-known official version of Chinese modern history, starting from the First Opium War, where China was characterised as a “semi-colonial and semi-feudal society” 半殖民地半封建社会. As a result, the Chinese people pined for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation 中华民族伟大复兴. According to Xi, this was achieved by the CCP, which united and led the Chinese people for the past hundred years.

The narrative is a familiar one — “only socialism could save China, and only socialism could develop China” 只有社会主义才能救中国，只有社会主义才能发展中国. Later on, Xi also said that “The Party was chosen by history and the people” 历史和人民选择了中国共产党. This reflects a sense of historical inevitability, as we mentioned last week. We have made enough critique of this sweeping historical narrative of the CCP, so I won’t repeat it here.

The speech ended with:

伟大、光荣、正确的中国共产党万岁！

伟大、光荣、英雄的中国人民万岁！

Long live our great, glorious, and correct Party!

Long live our great, glorious, and heroic people!

“Long live” in Chinese is literally “ten thousand years”. None of the Chinese dynasties has survived 1000 years, let alone 10,000 years. And so far, the CCP has not surpassed the Qing or the Ming (each 276 years).

For a speech heavy on rhetoric and light on policy, I was surprised that one issue was mentioned. In the middle of the speech, Xi raised “imbalances and inadequacies in development” as one specific problem to be tackled. This seems to be more specific than the other issues around it, such as “safeguard social fairness and justice” or “pressing difficulties and problems that are of great concern to the people”.

International dimension

This speech is targeted at the domestic audience. For those of us outside China, we may wonder what the speech means for other countries.

Again there are no surprises here. Xi claims that CCP will work together with “all peace-loving countries and peoples” 一切爱好和平的国家和人民. Xi claims that the CCP “welcome helpful suggestions and constructive criticisms” 有益的建议和善意的批评, but will not accept “sanctimonious preaching”. Of course, the CCP will determine whether something is “constructive criticism” or “sanctimonious preaching”. But from more recent experiences, it appears that every criticism is “sanctimonious preaching” to the CCP. I do not recall the CCP willingly accepting any form of criticism from the outside in recent years.

There is one passage that attracted much (in my opinion, unwarranted) attention on social media:

同时，中国人民也绝不允许任何外来势力欺负、压迫、奴役我们，谁妄想这样干，必将在14亿多中国人民用血肉筑成的钢铁长城面前碰得头破血流！

By the same token, we will never allow any foreign force to bully, oppress, or subjugate us. Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.

The official English translation of 头破血流 here is “on a collision course”, but literally in Chinese, it means “head broken and blood flow”. Some people interpret the literal translation as evidence for CCP’s violent intentions towards other countries (even though it supposedly is reserved for countries that “bully, oppress, or subjugate us”).

In any case, we should be wary of literal translations that are absent of cultural context. For example, imagine if we literally translate “heads will roll” or “thrown under a bus” into other languages. Yes, the phrase “head broken and blood flow” is intended to convey strong determination and conjure violent imagery, but literal translation has its pitfalls.

In addition, it is not up to leaders from a non-English speaking country to cater their speech to suit English speakers, as some have suggested. Just like we don’t expect English-speaking leaders to avoid phrases such as “heads will roll” in case of misunderstanding.

Overseas Chinese

Xi also mentioned overseas Chinese people:

爱国统一战线是中国共产党团结海内外全体中华儿女实现中华民族伟大复兴的重要法宝。

The patriotic united front is an important means for the Party to unite all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, both at home and abroad, behind the goal of national rejuvenation.

The CCP’s goal of co-opting overseas Chinese people is well-known by now. But it’s also worth bearing in mind that such calls for overseas Chinese to participate in “rejuvenating” China have roots older than the CCP. After all, Sun Yat-sen relied on overseas Chinese communities for support and fundraising in the 1900s. In addition, calls for diasporas to help their “homeland” is quite common in many countries, including India.

2. Didi

Another big news from the tech world, following on from Ant Financial’s scuttled IPO in December last year. Didi, a ride-hailing company ubiquitous in China (also present here in Canberra), is now under investigation from China’s Cyberspace Administration, days after its $4 billion NYSE IPO. While the investigation is ongoing, Didi stopped registering new users and removed its app from app stores.

Disregard the merit of the case, just like with Ant Financial, the timing of the investigation is worrying. This regulatory action appears to be punishing new investors in Didi. However, the crackdown on tech companies may not be solely targeted at Didi. Cyberspace Administration has also opened investigations into online recruiting company Zhipin and truck-hailing company Full Truck Alliance, both listed in the US. China is also set to block Tencent’s videogaming mergers.

The reason for Didi’s investigation is data protection — the regulator alleges that Didi had collected users’ personal data illegally, and asked Didi to comply with data protection laws.

An example of Didi’s data analytics:

What interests me is the approach taken by the Chinese government towards the big tech companies. China appears to be willing to crack down on big tech companies publicly rather than working more closely with them behind the scene, as you may come to expect from a state capitalist system. The Chinese government has worked very closely with tech giants in the past, including in censorship. So why is it cracking down on data protection so publicly?

It appears that in comparison the US Government is more willing to work closely with US tech companies right now, especially as the competition with China intensifies in the tech field. 

3. Freedom of speech for China scholars and students

Sophie McNeill from Human Rights Watch released a new report They Don't Understand The Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedom at Australia’s Universities.

The report detailed how some students and academics are fearful of speaking out. For some international students, they fear that Chinese authorities could pressure or coerce their families and friends in China or they could get into trouble when they return to China if they ever criticise the Chinese Government. On the other hand, some students are also labelled “brainwashed” or “compromised” if they ever defend the Chinese Government.

For some academics, they fear for their access to China if they criticise China publicly, but they also fear discrimination, loss of grant funding, and questions of loyalty, if they don’t criticise China publicly.

All this means that students and academics are likely to self-censor when it comes to public or classroom discussions of China.

Freedom of speech and academic freedom should be paramount values for Australian universities. And protecting the safety and wellbeing of students and staff should be the top priority for these universities as well.

Australian society, governments, and universities must do more to protect these students and academics. Law enforcement officers must take intimidation and harassment, including doxing, more seriously. And universities must implement severe penalties for people who report classroom discussions.

Australia must protect students and academics from intimidation and harassment while at the same time protecting their rights to peacefully express their views, regardless of whether these views are “pro-China” or “anti-China”.

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1. Party centennary

In a few days, on July 1, the CCP will commemorate its centennary. 

In Chinese culture, 100 years is synonymous with longevity (长命百岁). Whatever we may think about its longevity, CCP has certainly come a long way. Founded in 1921 amid political and social upheaval, it has survived vicious struggles, both internally and against external foes. Today, the CCP is the most powerful political organisation in the world, with 92 million members, ruling over a fifth of humanity.

The Party has organised a full-year program in celebration of its centennial, including a Party history education campaign, exhibitions and cultural performances, seminars and conferences, and the publication of numerous books and documentaries.

In recent months, the Party-state’s propaganda system has been in overdrive. The chorus of songs and praises of the CCP and its historical achievements is loud and tiring. Much of the rhetoric has been self-glorifying.

In short, there are three parts of the Party’s message. First, the Party’s successes were part of a historical process that was inevitable. Second, the 100-year history of the Party is a glorious one characterised by high-minded idealism and moral rectitude. And third, under the CCP’s leadership, the Chinese nation will again become powerful and respected.

The hubristic rhetoric of the Party about its place in history is laughable if not for the serious consequences this has for China’s future.

What worries me about this rhetoric is that its ahistorical. It ignores historical contingency and complexity; it sanitises the darker aspects of the Party’s past; and it offers a vision for a meeting with historical destiny.

The CCP’s centennial is an occasion for us to reflect on its complex and ambivalent past, and the role that it has played in shaping Chinese modernity.

2. Farewell, Apple Daily

Hong Kong pro-democracy tabloid Apple Daily was forced to shut in yet another setback for media freedom in Hong Kong. The last issue of the tabloid went out on Thursday.

After Hong Kong’s national security law was enacted last July, the clock started to tick down for Apple Daily. The paper’s founder, top editor and multiple executives have been arrested under the law. In addition, its office has been raided and assets were frozen.

To be clear, Apple Daily was forced to shut because it published articles that were critical of the authorities in Hong Kong and Beijing. Its targeting by the authorities sends a loud message to others in the city: you will pay a high price for political dissent.

The demise of Apple Daily is a symbol of the unravelling of the freedoms guaranteed by Beijing to the city upon its handover by the British in 1997. This unravelling has been accelerating following the 2019/2020 protests. The CCP leadership subscribes to the view that crackdown on political dissent and reinforcing its control over the city is necessary for political stability. The issue with this logic is that it sows the seeds for future cycles of resistance and oppression: repression begets resistance, and further repression is needed to quell resistance.

Hong Kong has been a special place in the Chinese-speaking world. For decades it has been the nexus between China and the wider world, a gateway, a crossroad where cultures, peoples, ideas and businesses meet.

Hong Kong may continue to be a financial center, but with the erosion of freedom of speech and rule of law, the city will lose its special magic as a cultural crucible and twilight zone of political possibilities.

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3. Kiwifruit

Kiwifruit is New Zealand’s biggest horticultural export by both volume and value. In 2020, the Zespri, the country’s giant kiwifruit cooperative, had a revenue of around US$2.7 billion. The most valuable of all Kiwifruit varieties is the Sungold:

Sungold was developed in 2010 to be resilient to a new disease that had wiped out much of the country’s Kiwifruit vines. In the mid-2010s, some of its vines were smuggled to China. Now, there are thousands of hectares of the fruit being cultivated by Chinese growers. 

This is a big deal for the New Zealand’s Kiwifruit industry. Zespri believes that even at the low end of estimates, vines cultivated in China will produce as much as New Zealand exports to China (around 30 million trays).

Zespri has tried to shut this down by going through China’s legal system. It has not been successful because it doesn’t have the support of Beijing.

Without the ability to stop the vine from spreading in China, Zespri has proposed a new strategy. Rather than going after Chinese orchards, it is proposing a year-long trial to buy the fruits from these orchards and market them in China under the Zespri brand.

This is interesting on a number of levels. First, in Jason Young’s words: “The Zespri question is really one of what happens if you lose control of your intellectual property in the Chinese market?” 

Businesses may not be able to rely on the legal system in China to protect its intellectual property. Even if Zespri got the central government in Beijing behind an effort to shut down Chinese orchards, there is no guarantee that provincial or local authorities would play along.

Second, there is the question of how to deal with differences with Chinese actors. For example, New Zealand could make this a diplomatic issue. In this case, working with Chinese growers may seem unpalatable (“why should I pay you to counterfeit my fruit?”), but it may be a pragmatic approach.

Third, and this is what I enjoy the most: what goes around comes around. 

Kiwifruit turns out to have been native to China. Records of the fruit go back as far as the 12th century. In China, the fruit is known as “macaque peach” 猕猴桃. Vines of the fruit were taken from China to New Zealand in 1904. New Zealand’s mass cultivation and export of the fruit started in the 1950s. Marketed as “Kiwifruit”, New Zealand’s national fruit actually has Chinese origins.

Beyond the irony involved, the point is that China is not an island today, nor was China ever an island. The flow of people, goods, ideas, and indeed, fruits, have shaped, and continue to shape, the world of which China is a part of.